LAWS(MAD)-1993-7-28

KANNADIAN KALVAI NCCR PASANA VIVASAYIGAL SANGAM Vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR TIRUNELVELI KATTABOMMAN DISTRICT TIRUNCLVCLI

Decided On July 08, 1993
KANNADIAN KALVAI NCCR PASANA VIVASAYIGAL SANGAM Appellant
V/S
DISTRICT COLLECTOR TIRUNELVELI KATTABOMMAN DISTRICT TIRUNCLVCLI Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is an appeal preferred against the order dated 5. 3. 1993 passed by the learned single Judge in W. P. No. 3556 of 1993. Learned single Judge has rejected the writ petition. Therefore, the petitioner in the writ petition has come up in appeal.

(2.) IN the writ petition, the petitioner sought for a declaration that the respondents are not entitled to enhance the local cess and local cess surcharge under Secs. 115 and 116 respectively of the Tamil Nadu panchayat Act, 1958, as amended by Tamil Nadu Act 27 of 1992, (hereinafter referred to as' 'the Act' ') without being preceded by a resolution of a duly elected Panchayat Union Council constituted under the Act.

(3.) THE further submission of learned counsel is that the expression' 'may' ' used in Sec. 116 of the Act makes all the difference, because it is open to the Panchayat Union council to enhance or not to enhance. Learned counsel submits that as there is a discretion vested in the Panchayat Union Council and such discretion can be exercised only when there is an elected Panchayat Union Council in office, the officer appointed under Sec. l55 (4) of the Act is not expected to exercise the discretion which an elected council is expected to exercise. This submission overlooks the very provisions contained in Sec. 155 (4) of the Act, which as already pointed out empowers the officer to exercise all the powers of the panchayat and discharge all the duties of the Panchayat Union Council and of its Chairman. In this regard, it may also be remembered that it is one of the cardinal rules of interpretation that while interpreting a statute care should be taken to ensure as far as possible that no word or a part of a statute is rendered otiose. Thus it follows that it is not possible to accept the interpretation put forth by learned counsel on Sec. 155 (4) of the Act and Rule 2 of the Rules referred to above. Hence, it is rejected.