MANAGING DIRECTOR Vs. DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF LABOUR II LABOUR WELFARE BOARD BUILDING DMS COMPOUND TEYNAMPET MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ appeal has been filed against the order allowing W. P. No. 5192 of 1982 filed by the second respondent herein praying for the issue of a writ at certiorari to quash the order of the 1st respondent dated 30. 6. 1981 in T. S. E. Case No. 43 of 1976.

(2.) THE second respondent was working as a Junior assistant/cashier/recovery Assistant in the Repatriate Co-operative Finance and development Bank, the appellant, hereinafter referred to as the appellant bank. According to the second respondent, he was sick in the month of August, 1973 and he applied for 15 days leave from 14. 8. 1973 to 30. 8. 1973 by submitting a letter dated 16. 8. 1973 to the appellant bank. THEreafter, he sent a medical certificate dated 22. 8. 1973. However, the appellant bank treated the period from 14. 8. 1973 as absence without leave, suspended him from service and thereafter issued a charge memo dated 22. 5. 1974 containing the following three charges: 1. He was careless and negligent in the performance of his duty and this has caused financial loss to the Bank. 2. He was responsible for damaging the reputation of the bank.

(3.) . In Itlyavira Mathia v. Varkey Varkey,a. I. R. 1964 S. C. 907, in a suit instituted before the repeal of Travancore High Court Act 4 of 1099 an appeal was filed after the repeal of that Act by Act 5 of 1125. At the time of filing the appeal even Scc. 24 of the latter Act, which provided that a full Bench will hear and decide the appeal from the decrees of the District courts in which the amount or value of the subject matter is in excess of rs. 5,000 stood repealed. The appellants contended before the Supreme Court that their appeal could be heard only by a Bench of three Judges as provided by Sec. 11 (1) of the Travancore High Court Act 4 of 1099. The supreme Court repelling the above contention of the appellants pointed out that the High Court of Travancore was itself abolished as the result of the merger and a new High Court came into being viz. the High Court of Travan-core-Cochin. The Supreme Court further pointed out that the rights of the parties to prefer appeals to that High Court were governed initially by Ordinance II of 1124 and later by Act V of 1125. These provisions came into being subsequent to the institution of the suit and therefore, the rights of a person aggrieved by the decision of a suit instituted prior to the coming into force of Act V of 1125 were only those which were conferred by that Act In the above decision, the supreme Court has further held as follows: "a litigant has no right to contend that a tribunal before whom he should have taken an appeal when he instituted the suit should not be abolished. The Legislature has full power to enact a law of that kind and it is not contended before us that the repeal of the Travancore High Court act was unconstitutional. It would, therefore, follow that whatever rights may have vested in the party in the matter of filing an appeal were abrogated by competent legislature. New rights were conferred in place of those which were taken away and it is only the new rights which could be availed of. &quot '