S G PONNAMBALAM Vs. T A PALANIVELU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE defendants are the revision petitioners in this civil revision petition, which arises out of I. A. No. 734 of 1992 filed by the respondent-plaintiff in his suit O. S. No. 479 of 1992. In the suit and LA. , he has claimed that he is a lessee of the suit property and that the defendants-landlords are interfering with his possession. So, in the suit he sought for permanent injunction and in I. A. No. 734 of 1992, for temporary injunction. THE said I. A. was allowed and the court granted temporary injunction. THE said temporary injunction was confirmed in appeal in c. M. A. No. 21 of 1992 filed by the defendants. Aggrieved by the abovesaid concurrent grant of temporary injunction by the courts below, the defendants have preferred this civil revision petition.

(2.) . The main submission of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that even assuming that the respondent-plaintiff was in possession of the suit non-residential building after the death, in 1982, of his father Arunachalam Chettiar (who was admittedly the lessee of a part of the suit building namely Door No. 2, while the suit building consists of Door Nos. 1 and 2) the respondent-plaintiff is not a' 'tenant' 'within the meaning of Sec. 2 (8) (ii) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent control) Act even as per the respondent' 's own plea in his plaint. Sec. 2 (8) of the said Act defines the term' 'tenant' '/and the relevant portion of the definition runs as follows: ' 'Sec2 (8):' 'tenant' 'means any person by wh0m or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son, or daughter, or the legal representative of a deceased tenant who- (i ). . . . . . . (ii) in the case of a non-residential building, had been in continuous association with the tenant for the purpose of carrying on the business of the tenant upto the death of the tenant and continues to carry on such business thereafter,. . . . .' '. So, according to this definition, in the case of a non-residential building, after the death of the original tenant, if the successor wants to claim as a tenant of the said non-residential building, he should have been in continuous association with the original tenant, for the purpose of carrying on the business of the original tenant, upto his death, and should also have continued the said business in the said building after the said death also. But, in the present case, according to the petitioners' 'counsel, the first of the abovesaid two requirements (namely, the abovesaid association upto the death of the original tenant), stipulated under sec. 2 (8) (ii) has not even been pleaded in the plaint in the suit. The relevant plea in the plaint is as follows: ' 'The suit property was originally leased out in the year 1962 by one Rukmani Ammal who is the mother of the 1st defendant to the father of the plaintiff namely T. A. Arunachalam Chettiar and he took the property for lease in the year 1962 and he died in the year 1982, till then the plaintiff's father was running the old and waste paper business and vessels business. At the beginning, the plaintiff's father was paying Rs. 100 as rent for both the shops. After the demise, the plaintiff herein started doing the same business in the suit property from the year 1982 and till to-day.' ' The learned counsel points out that there is absolutely no plea as to the above requirement of the respondent's association with the original tenant's business prior to his death. If that is so, according to the counsel, the respondent cannot be a tenant at all under the said Act, unless there is evidence to show that a new landlord and tenant relationship has come into being between the defendants and the plaintiff subsequently after the death of the original tenant in 1982. In the present case, the learned counsel points out that there is absolutely no documentary, or other acceptable evidence showing that such relationship has come into being. Therefore, according to the said counsel, there is no justification at all for granting temporary injunction in favour of the plaintiff, when the plaintiff has not thus shown that he is in lawful possession of the suit building.