R RAJAGOPAL Vs. M P CHELLAMUTHU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS Letters Patent appeal has been filed against the Order dated 8.4.1993 made in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 filed by the first respondent herein, directing respondents 2 to 4 herein to permit the first respondent herein to quarry sand in Amaravathi river for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993.

(2.) IN the Sub Application No.133 of 1992 in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992, the appellant along with 5 others was sought to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992. However, Sub-Application 133 of 1992 was not pressed by the first respondent herein in the course of the proceedings in Contempt Application No.507 of 1992 and the parties proposed to be impleaded as respondents 4 to 9 were given up. The appellant got leave of this Court to file this L.P.A. in C.M.P.No.8488 of 1993.

(3.) LET us first examine the preliminary objections raised by the learned counsel for the first respondent with regard to the maintainability of this L.P. A. The contention of the learned counsel for the first respondent is that in as much as by the order under appeal, respondents 2 to 4 have been discharged and nobody is punished under the provisions of the Act, the appeal filed against such an order is not maintainable-under Sec.19(1) of the Act. The learned counsel further contended that if an appeal against the order made in contempt application 507 of 1992 does not lie under Sec. 19(1) of the Act, it does not follow that Clause 15 of the LETters Patent could be invoked and therefore, the present appeal filed under Clause 15 of the LETters Patent is also not maintainable. An identical contention regarding the maintainability of a LETters Patent Appeal came up for consideration before a Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1990 and LETters Patent Appeal No.l23 of l990. The Division Bench of this Court by the judgment dated 14.8.1990 in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, Contempt Appeal No.5 of 1990 and LETters Patent Appeal No. 123 of 1990, while holding that an appeal under Clause 15 of the LETters Patent would lie against any order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the High Court, provided such an order or decision is a judgment and satisfies the other requirements of Clause 15 of the LETters Patent, has observed as follows: "Various judgments, where recourse to an appeal under the LETters Patent has not been permitted, dealt with cases where the act provided an express prohibition or exclusion of an appeal under any other law. That was the petition in Union of India v. Mohindra Supply Company, A.I.R. 1962 S.C. 256:1962 All.L.J. 1: (1962)2 S.C.J. 179: (1962)2 M.L.J. S.C. 63: (1962)2 An W.R. S.C. 63: (1962)3 S.C.R. 497, which concerned with the provisions contained in Sec.39(2) of the Arbitration Act and A.I.R. 1965 S.C. 1442, dealing with the Delhi Rent Control Act. Sec.l00-A of the Code of Civil Procedure is again one of such instances where recourse to the LETters Patent cannot be had. Since, in our opinion, Sec.l9(l) of the Act cannot be construed to be destructive of the valuable right of an appeal granted by Clause 15 of the LETters Patent and there is no provision contained in the Contempt of Courts Act abrogating or excluding the provisions of Clause 15 of the LETters Patent, we hold that except to the extent of the occupied field covered by Sec.l9(l) of the Act, an appeal under Clause 15 of the LETters Patent would lie against any order or decision passed in exercise of the contempt jurisdiction of the high Court, provided such an order or decision is a "judgment" and satisfied the other conditions laid down in Clause 15 of the LETters Patent and does not fall in any of the excluded categories. We, therefore, overrule the preliminary objection relating to the non-maintainability of the appeal under Clause 15 of the LETters Patent on the facts of the instant case". We are in entire agreement with the above view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in Vidya Charan Shukla v. Tamil Nadu Olympic Association and another, Contempt Appeal No. 5 of 1990 and LETters Patent Appeal No. 123 of 1990. Inasmuch as by the order under appeal, the learned single Judge has declared that the first respondent is entitled to quarry sand in the area in question for a period of 3 1/2 months and directed the respondents 2 to 4 to permit the first respondent to quarry sand for a period of 3 1/2 months from 1.5.1993, we are inclined to hold that such an order is a "judgment" for the purpose of Clause 15 of the LETters Patent and that the order under appeal satisfies the conditions prescribed in Clause 15 of the LETters Patent. In these circumstances, we have no hesitation in holding that the present appeal is maintainable under Clause 15 of the LETters Patent.