S MOHANAKRISHNAN Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE writ petition is for the issue of writ of mandamus directing the 2nd respondent to announce the results of the petitioner in respect of Tamil Subject examination of 10th Standard revised course held in the month of March, 1993 and also issue mark sheet.

(2.) WHEN the writ miscellaneous petition came up for admission, by consent of parties, the main writ petition itself is taken up for disposal. The factsare: The petitioner was a student of 10th Standard Class in the Madras Christian College Higher Secondary School at Chetpet. After completing the Course, the petitioner wrote the Xth Standard examination in April, 1992, but since he was not successful and failed in the subject Tamil, he wrote the Tamil paper in the supplementary examination held in October, 1992 after taking necessary coaching in the 3rd respondent. As the petitioner had once again failed in the subject (Tamil) he took up the examination in March, 1993 and wrote the same as a private candidate at Pallavaram Government Higher Secondary School . The results in respect of the examination held in March, 1993 were published in june, 1993, but the results of the petitioner and other students were withheld. WHEN the petitioner contacted the 2nd respondent, he was asked to send a postal order for Rs. 2. Thereafter the petitioner sent a letter on 22. 7. 1993 to the 2nd respondent for the publication of the results of the petitioner but nothing was forthcoming. In the meanwhile, it is alleged, the petitioner's father has made arrangements to secure admission for the petitioner into the technical Institute at Coimbatore so as to improve the future of the petitioner. Since the date of admission to the said Technical Institute is fast approaching and since the petitioner's result in the Tamil subject (concerning X Standard) had not yet been published, the petitioner has come forward with this writ petition.

(3.) IN Union of INdia v. Anglo Afghan Agencies, A. I. R. 1968 S. C. 718: (1968)2 S. C. R. 366, the question came up for consideration before the Supreme Court was whether persons acting on representation made by the Government, can claim in the absence of execution of formal contract under art. 299 of the Constitution, that Government shall be bound to carry out promise. IN that case the Supreme Court has held: "we hold that the claim of the respondents is appropriately founded upon the equity which arises in their favour as a result of the representation made on behalf of the Union of INdia in the Export promotion Scheme, and the action taken by the respondents acting upon that representation under the belief that the Government would carry out the representation made by it. On the facts proved in this case no ground has been suggested before the court for exempting the Government from the equity arising out of the acts done by the exporters to their prejudice relying upon the representation. This principle has been recognised by the courts in INdia and by the Judicial committee of the Privy Council in several cases. IN Municipal Corporation of the City of Bombay v. Secretary of State, 1964 I. L. R. 29 Bom. 580, it was held by the Bombay High Court that even though there is no formal contract as required by the statute, the Government may be bound by a representation made by it. IN that case in answer to a requisition by the Government of Bombay addressed to the Municipal Commissioner to remove certain fish and vegetable markets to facilitate the construction of an arterial road, the Municipal commissioner offered to remove the structures if the government would agree to rent to the Municipality other land mentioned in his letter at the nominal rent. The Government accepted the suggestion and sanctioned the application of the Municipal Commissioner for asite for stabling and establishing the new markets. The Municipal Commissioner then took possession of the land so made available and constucted stables workshops and cha-wls thereon. Twenty-four years thereafter the Government of Bombay served notices on the Municipal commissioner determining the tenancy and requesting the Commissioner to deliver possession of the land occupied by the markets and to pay in the meantime rent at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per annum. The Municipality declined to pay the rent and the Secretary to State for INdia filed a suit against the Municipal commissioner for a declaration that the tenancy of the Municipality created by government Resolution of December 9,1865, stood determined and for an order to pay rent at the rate of Rs. 12,000 per annum. It was urged before the High Court of Bombay that the events which had transpired had created an equity in favour of the Municipality which afforded an answer to the claim of, the Government to eject the Municipality, Jenkins, C. J. , delivering the judgment of the Court observed. ' 'The doctrine involved in this phase of the case is often treated as one of estoppel, but I doubt whether this is correct, through it may be a convenient name to apply. It differs essentially from the doctrine embodied in Sec. 115 of the Evidence Act which is not a rule of equity but is a rule of evidence that was formulated and applied in Courts of law, while the doctrine with which i am now dealing, takes its origin from the jurisdiction assumed by courts of equity to intervene in the case of or to prevent fraud' '. After referring to Ramsden v. Dyson, (1866) L. R. IH. L. 129 (170), the learned Chief Justice observed that the Crown comes within the range of equity and proceeded to examine whether the facts of the case invited the application of that principle. This case, is in our judgment, a clear authority that even though the case does not fall within the terms of Sec. 115 of the Evidence act, it is still open to a party who has acted on a representation made by the government to claim that the Government shall be bound to carry out the promise made by it even though the promise is not recorded in the form of a formal contract as required by the Constitution' '. It is further held by the Supreme Court that: Under our jurisprudence the Government is not exempt from liability to carry out the representation made by it as to its future contract and it cannot on some undefined and undisclosed ground of necessity or expediency fail to carry out the promise solemnly made by it, nor claim to be the judge of its own obligation to the citizen on ex parte appraisement of the circumstances in which the obligation has arisen' '. It is true that the principle of promissory/equi-table estoppel cannot override the provisions of any statute and there cannot be any estoppel against any Statute, but if the case on hand is looked into, certainly, I am of the view, the principle of equitable estoppel has got to be applied.