A DOSS AROCKIANATHAN Vs. S RITA

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The tenant is the petitioner. His landlady, the respondent herein came forward with H.R.C.4135 of 1980 on the file of the XIII Judge, Court of Small Causes Madras seeking the petitioners eviction under section 10 (2) (i), 10 (2) (v) and 10 (3) (c) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (hereinafter referred to as the Act). The learned Rent Controller accepted the grounds of wilful default and nuisance and therefore directed eviction of the petitioner. On the petitioners appeal, H.R.A.798 of 1981, on the file of the VI Judge, Court of Small Causes, Madras, the Appellate Authority some what differed from the learned Rent Controller and held that the tenant was guilty of wilful default and that the tenant was not liable to be evicted on the complaint of nuisance, while it confirmed the finding of the learned Rent Controller regarding the landlords case for additional accommodation. In view of its finding on the ground of wilful default, the appellate authority also ordered eviction of the petitioner.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner challenged the finding of the learned Appellate Authority regarding wilful default. Finding that there is force in the said argument of the learned counsel for the petitioner, the learned counsel for the respondent in turn canvassed the finding of the learned Appellate Authority about nuisance. 1 have pointed out even at the outset that though the landladys complaint of nuisance found favour with the learned Rent Controller. It was rejected by the Appellate Authority. As I find that the landladys complaint of nuisance deserves acceptance, I do not propose to advert to the ground of wilful default.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioner fairly conceded that though the respondent had not preferred any revision against such adverse finding of , the Appellate Authority regarding her case under section 10 (2) (v) of the Act, she is-entitled to assail such adverse findings of the Appellate Authority in revision filed by the petitioner-tenant, because the landlady came forward with a sole petition claiming eviction on three grounds and because she was favoured with an order of eviction on one ground or other in the courts below. It is already seen that the learned Rent Controller did uphold the landladys complaint of acts of nuisance on the part of the tenant. It is interesting to note that even the Appellate Authority did find as a matter of fact that There is evidence to show that the acts of the appellant must have necessarily caused disturbance to the dwellers of the houses in the vicinity. Notwithstanding such finding, the Appellate Authority rejected the landladys claim for eviction on the ground that that cannot form the basis of an order of eviction under the provisions of section 10 (2) (v) of the Act. I find, the respondent is entitled to take advantage of such concurrent finding of fact and that her task is limited to pointing out that the approach made by the Appellate Authority in its interpretation of section 10 (2) (iv) of the Act can hardly be sustained.