JABBAR SAHIB Vs. V R RENU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal is filed by the plaintiff in O. S. No. 370 of 1958, on the file of the District Munsif of Vellore. He had taken a lease of the plaint schedule properties from the defendant for a period of 5 years by a registered lease deed dated 25-8-1956 and had paid in advance a sum of Rs. 750 as rent for the entire period. Subsequently, the minor son of the defendant, represented by his grandfather as next friend, filed a suit O. S. No. 714 of 1956 impleading the present defendant as the first defendant, and the present plaintiff as the second defendant. In that suit the minor son of the defendant alleged that his father was wasting the joint family properties, that the transactions effected by him including the suit lease were effected for debts of an Avyavaharika nature, that therefore they would not be binding on the minor son, and that consequently the Joint family properties including the properties in the present suit, the subject-matter of the lease, should be divided by-metes and bounds and the plaintiff given possession of an one-half share. In this suit the present defendant remained ex parte and the present plaintiff was forced to enter into a compromise with the minor and pay him Rs. 275 as a result of which he was allowed to remain in possession of the leased property for the rest of the lease period. Alleging that the lease deed involved a covenant for quiet enjoyment, but that covenant had been broken, the plaintiff filed the present suit for recovery of Rs. 275, the amount which he had to pay under the compromise aforesaid. The defendant urged that there was no threat to the plaintiff's enjoyment of the suit property, and that if the plaintiff had incurred any expense or paid any amount in connection with the prior suit, it was not warranted by the situation and that therefore the defendant was not liable to pay any amount to the plaintiff.

(2.) THE trial court accepted the contention of the defendant and dismissed the suit with costs. The learned Subordinate Judge of Vellore, to whom the plaintiff appealed, took the following facts as the principal circumstances into consideration for confirming the decree of the trial court :

(3.) IT is urged by the learned counsel appearing for the appellant-plaintiff in this second appeal, that some of the factual statements made by the appellate Judge above extracted are incorrect and secondly the legal inference drawn by him on the facts is also opposed to law. Under Section 108 (c) of the Transfer of Property act, the lessor shall be deemed to contract with the lessee that, if the latter pays the rent reserved by the lease and performs the contracts binding on the lessee, he may hold the property during the time limited by the lease without interruption. This provision also means that the title, which has been conveyed by the lessor to the lessee, is a good title and that there is no infirmity in it. The words 'without interruption' in Section 108 (c) are not qualified in any way, and have been understood to mean what in England is known as a covenant for quiet enjoyment in an unqualified form. The covenant protects the lessee only against lawful disturbance, but does not cover tortious entries, eviction or interruptions by trespassers. In the present case, there is no allegation that the lessee did not fulfil any of the terms of the lease. He had paid the rent in advance. It is also to be pointed out that though the defendant pleaded in the written statement that a balance of Rs. 300 was due under the lease deed, he did not adduce any satisfactory evidence, about this contention. The trial court observed that under the lease deed a sum of rs. 450 was paid in cash and a sum of Rs. 300 was paid at the time of the registration and that the defendant, as D. W. 1, did not at all speak to anything about the consideration which passed under Ex. A-l. The trial court found that there was no evidence to show that the defendant received only Rs. 300 under the lease deed as contended by him. Consequently, the plaintiff had done all that he had covenanted to do under the lease deed, and in such circumstances the defendant must be deemed under the law as having given a covenant for quiet possession.