RAJA JAGAVEERA RAMA MUTHUKUMARA VENKATESWARA ETTAPPA NAICKER AYYAN AVL. RAJA OF ETTAYAPURAM, REPRESENTED BY K. RAMAN NAIR, POWER OF ATTORNEY AGENT Vs. THE MADRAS STATE ELECTRICITY BOARD BY ITS PRESIDENT, AND ANOTHER

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal instituted by the petitioner in W.P. No. 947 of 1958, which was dealt with by Ramachandra Iyer, J., (as he then was), involves an interesting question of the interpretation of the terms of S. 3(1) and 3(2) of the Madras Essential Articles (Control and Requisition) Act, Act XXIX of 1949. The actual point involved, however, is a very simple one, and may be dealt with in a brief compass. The writ petitioner is a large consumer of electrical energy from the Papanasam Hydro Electric Supply Project. He was charged at the normal tariff rates for consumption within the quota, but, in regard to excess consumption, an enhanced rate was levied under certain orders, into the particulars of which we need not enter. Upon the question of gross delay in instituting these proceedings, the learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer, J.,) observed that the petitioner had acquiesced in the orders of Government in the matter since 1953, and had sought relief under Art. 226 of the Constitution only in 1953, the laches alone may disentitle him to relief. But, apart from that, the learned Judge held that the Government Order was not beyond the powers conferred on the State Government under Ss. 3(1) and 3(2) of the Act XXIX of 1949. That is substantially the matter argued before us.

(2.) Incidentally, it is of some interest to note that in Adoni Ginning Factory v/s. Government of Andhra Pradesh, (1957) 2 A.W.R. 29, the learned Judges of that Court held that a notification of that Government, upon very similar facts, was arbitrary and an excessive invasion of private rights, and did not fall within the ambit of the powers conferred on the State by S.3 of the Act. The matter came up in appeal before the Bench of Chandra Ready, C.I. and Ansari, J., and the appellate judgment is reported in Secretary to Government Public Works and Transports Dept., Andhra Pradesh v/s. Adoni Ginning Factory : A.I.R. 1959 A.P. 538. The learned Judges of the Bench held, differing from the learned single Judge (Satyanarayana Raju, J.,) that the Act did not constitute any infringement of fundamental rights either under Art. 14 or under Art. 19(f) and (g), further that S. 10 of the Act would expressly save orders issued under S. 3, even though such order might entrench upon private contracts, and hence that the orders were validly issued by the Government within the proper scope of S. 3. Learned Counsel for the appellant (Sri R. Rangachari) does not now press this line of argument before us.

(3.) There is also a question of some degree of interest, which, however, does not appear to have been advanced before the learned Judge (Ramachandra Iyer, J.,) in that farm, whether electrical energy, which is indisputably a form of energy without tangible shape and substance, could properly fall within the term "essential article" as used in S. 2(a) of the Act. But we notice that the Schedule to the Act specifically includes electrical energy under S. 2(a) which in its turn, includes articles specified in the Schedule. The argument, therefore, does not really arise, apart from any question of legislative competence, which is not involved with regard to this Act and its provisions. We are hence left with the single ground which was pressed before Ramachandra Iyer, J. namely, that electrical energy does not fall within the purview of S. 3 (1) or 3 (2) and hence that the State has no power to control the consumption of this energy in such manner as to levy a penal rate for excess consumption. The argument was that even if the article fell within the scope of S. 3 (2) (b), only the prices at which the essential commodity could be bought or sold can be competently determined. S. 3 (2) (d) which relates to a power to prohibit the withholding from sale of any essential article, would not, in terms apply - -either. The learned Judge agreed that S. 3 (2) (d) might not properly apply, and that S. 3 (2) (f) would be in like case. But he pointed out that S. 3 (2) (c) was very wide in its terms, and included a power to prohibit or regulate by licence, permit or otherwise "the storage, distribution, transport, disposal, acquisition, use or consumption of any essential article." In our view, the learned Judge was perfectly justified in holding that the Legislature thereby under S. 3 (2) (c) invested the Government with wide powers to fix differential rates for the consumption of electricity, the higher rate to operate beyond a specified quota, in the interests of economy of consumption of the energy. It follows that the writ appeal is lacking in merits, and it is accordingly dismissed. The parties will bear their own costs.