P.L.L. RAMANATHAN CHETTIAR AND OTHERS Vs. BOARD OF REVENUE, BY THE COMMISSIONER OF CIVIL SUPPLIES, MADRAS AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Though the petitioners were different, their petitions have been heard together, as they turn upon a common point. Both of them are existing rice mill owners in different villages. The third respondent in each of the petitions applied for and obtained permits for installing and running new rice mills in the particular villages under the provisions of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1959. The licensing authority had considered and overruled the objections of the petitions who are existing rice mill owners. The petitioners seek to quash the orders of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies in both the cases. The ground on which the orders of the Commissioner of Civil Supplies are canvassed is that as he exercises a quasi -judicial function under S. 5 (4) and (5) of the Act and as the orders passed under that Sec. are quasi -judicial, they are defective in that they do not contain any reasons. It is argued that because Sub -S. (4) of that Sec. directs the authority to cause a full and complete investigation to be made in the prescribed manner in respect of certain specified matters before the application for permit is granted, the orders granting permits must ex facie show that the licensing authority had taken those matters into consideration. I am unable to accept this contention. The Act is intended to regulate the rice milling industry in the interests of the general public and for that purpose it provides for appointment of certain licensing officers and lays down the principles on which they could grant permits. The Act also indicates that procedure to be followed by applicants as well as the authority in applying for and granting licences. The Act contains other provisions relating to revocation, suspension and amending of licenses, certain restrictions on rice mills and powers to inspect. It may be noticed mat the Act provides for no appeals against orders made under S. 5, unlike In the case of orders passed under S. 6 or 7. Having regard to these provisions, therefore, it seems to me that so far as the jurisdiction to grant permits under S. 5 is concerned, it is purely administrative. The mere fact that Sub -S. (4) of S 5 directs the licensing authority to take into account certain specified matters does not mean that for that reason its jurisdiction is quasi judicial in character. The jurisdiction under this provision does not involve, as it appears to me, any adjudication on rights. Due to exigencies calling for regulation S. 5 makes provisions in order to effectuate that purpose. It may be that in the course of giving effect to the regulatory provisions, persons, like the petitioners as existing rice mill owners may indirectly be affected in a certain sense. But that is no justification by itself to hold that the jurisdiction exercised under S. 5 is quasi -judicial.

(2.) Even so, I think, it is desirable that an authority acting under S. 5 briefly at least indicates the reasons for its orders, especially where objections to grant of permits are made for its consideration. But that is not to say that failure to give such reasons will necessarily affect the validity of such orders. Where no reasons are given in an order, prima facie, it is liable to be considered to be arbitrary. For that reason it may be necessary to issue rule nisi and call for the records so that this Court may be satisfied that the power under S. 5 has been justly and reasonably, and not arbitrarily exercised, more especially when the Act has provided do appeal against such orders.

(3.) It is true Rajagopalan, J. in P. K. N. Abdul Majid v/s. State of Madras : (1957) 2 M. L.J. 1=70 LW 547. (2), W. A No. 195 of 1962 was of the view that the jurisdiction of the authority issuing permits under S. 5 was quasi -judicial. But a Division Bench of this Court in Lakshmiammal v/s. P. V. Vaidyalingam and another (2) was apparently inclined to take a different, view, when the Court observed: