P. RATHINASWAMI PILLAI, PROPRIETOR, SWARNAMBIGAI MOTOR SERVICE Vs. THE REGIONAL TRANSPORT AUTHORITY AND ANR.

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution arises out of proceedings under the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939, as amended by the Central Act C of 1956 hereinafter referred to as the Act. The problem to be solved is as regards the scope of Sec. 60, Sub -section (3) of the Act. Srinivasan J., who heard the writ petition in the first instance, was apparently not inclined to agree with some of the decisions of this Court relating to the interpretation of the said provision, and was also of the opinion that there is a conflict of authority on the subject. On this expression of opinion, the papers were placed before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice and the writ petition has been directed to be posted before a Division Bench. The matter is certainly of some importance to transport operators, and it must be said that the point involved for decision is of frequent occurrence. Even at the outset, the learned Advocate -General appearing for the Petitioner pressed for reference to a Full Bench, as, in his submission, the view taken by the Division Bench consisting of Rajamannar C.J., and Venkatadri J., in Writ Appeal No. 153 of 1960 required reconsideration. It was also pointed out to us that the decision of another Division Bench of this Court in Natarajan v/s. State Tr. Appellate Tribunal : (1964) 1 M.L.J. 367 (Ganapatia Pillai and Kailasam JJ.) has expressed a view which is somewhat contrary to the view taken in Writ Appeal No. 153 of 1960. After careful consideration of ail the decisions on the subject to which our attention has been drawn and to the relevant statutory provisions we do not think that there is any necessity for the matter being referred to a Full Bench.

(2.) The undisputed facts giving rise to the writ petition are as follows. The Petitioner is a transport operator in Salem district. He held stage carriage permits, one permit in each of the three routes; (i) Edappadi to Velur (via) Kenganapuram, (ii) Salem to Jalakandapuram (via) Attayampatti, and (iii) Namakkal to Nangavalli (via) Rasipuram. On charges of failure to perform the services regularly, the Regional Transport Authority, Salem, asked the Petitioner to show cause why the permits in the three routes should not be cancelled under Sec. 60, Sub -section (1), Clause (a) of the Act. The Petitioner showed cause, and the Regional Transport Authority heard him 'through his Counsel. The Regional Transport Authority, then, issued an order cancelling the permits, as the Authority was not convinced by the explanation offered by the operator, in the matter of running the service properly. The Petitioner filed an appeal from the order of cancellation to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, and the Tribunal, by its order, dated 28th April 1958, affirmed, the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The Petitioner moved this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution seeking to quash the order of the Subordinate Tribunals in Writ Petition No. 365 of 1958. Rule nisi was issued, and stay of operation of the order of cancellation was also granted. The writ petition was, however, dismissed, at the final hearing, and, thereupon, the Petitioner filed an appeal in Writ Appeal No. 118 of 1960. During the pendency of the appeal, stay of operation of the order of cancellation continued. By Judgment, dated 31st January 1962, the appeal also stood dismissed. The Petitioner was called upon to surrender the permits. Under Rule 194 of the rules framed under the Act, a permit holder should surrender the permit, on receipt of a demand in writing by the Transport Authority, and the Transport Authority should record in Parts A and B of the permit the order of cancellation or suspension. Thus, the Authority wanted to give effect to the order of cancellation. At that stage, the Petitioner filed an application to the Regional Transport Authority, Salem, for permission to compound the offence, which entitled the cancellation, and this he purported to do invoking the aid of Sec. 60 , Sub -section (3) of the Act We shall refer to the terms of the Sec. a little later. The Regional Transport Authority dismissed the application, mainly on the ground that the power to compound cannot be exercised after an order of cancellation is passed. In its view, if the permit had already been cancelled, the Authority which cancelled the permit must be deemed to have exercised its discretion under Sec. 60(3) against the permit -holder, and that there is no provision for the Authority to reopen the matter and consider the request for composition. The Petitioner took up the matter in revision, as no appeal is provided for from such orders, to the State Transport Appellate Tribunal, which confirmed the order of the Regional Transport Authority. The Revisional Authority recorded its opinion in the following words:

(3.) The learned Advocate -General appearing for the Petitioner raised the following contentions : (i) The Regional Transport Authority and the State Transport Appellate Tribunal were in error in holding that the power to order composition under Sec. 60(3) became extinct after the order of cancellation or suspension of the permit. (ii) The terms of Sec. 60, Sub -section (3) of the Act necessarily imply that the right or benefit of composition can be invoked only after the authorities hold that the permit is liable to be cancelled or suspended for violation of the provisions in Clause (a), (b) or (c) of Sub -section (1) of Sec. 60, and that it would not be a proper construction of the Act to deprive a permit -holder of the remedy of composition, merely because he bona fide pleaded that there was no case against him to justify cancellation or suspension, and failed, (iii) The Sec. does not prescribe any formality like making an application or request, orally or in writing, by the permit -holder for composition, and that the Authority can, in the exercise of its discretion, pass such an order suo motu. Therefore the view that composition cannot be had after an order of cancellation or suspension is not tenable, (iv) If the Sec. were to be construed as meaning that the option of compounding has to be exercised before ' the authority adjudicates on the charge, it would operate as coercion on the 'operator to plead guilty without a fair chance to defend himself, and would also effectively take away its right of appeal from revocation or suspension of permit under Sec. 64(1)(6) of the Act.