(1.) The respondent who owns a total extent of S. 97 acres in S. No. 15/3, 15/4 and 18/2 in Poyamani village, Tiruchirapally District, granted a lease in favour of the petitioner, Perumal Muthiriyar, for cultivation. That Perumal Muthiriyar is a cultivating tenant is not a matter in controversy. Alleging that, in respect of an extent of 3 33 acres covered by S. 15/3, the petitioner has sublet the lands to one Vellakutti Muthiriyar, the respondent filed an application before the Revenue Court, Tiruchirapalli, for eviction of the petitioner, The Revenue Court found that there was a sub -lease of one of the three items of property in favour of Vellakutti Muthiriyar, and directed eviction of the petitioner from S. No. 15/3. The petitioner has contested that order in C. R. P. No. 1205 of 1962. The respondent also has contested the correctness of that order in C. R. P. No. 1952 of 1962, as, according to him, the Revenue Court should have directed eviction, not only in regard to one item of property, but in respect of all the Items. In support of the tenant's case, Mr. T.N. C. Srinivasavaradachary has raised three contentions. The first is tha there is no evidence in the case of any sub -lease by the tenant in favour of Vellakutti Mutthiriyar, and that, therefore, the finding of the Revenue Court in that regard must not be accepted. In support of the case that there has been such a sub -letting, the respondent was able to file Ex. P. 1, an agreement executed by Vellakutti Muthirlyar in favour of Kawari Sugars and Chemicals Ltd., undertaking to supply them with sugarcane grown. The document is in the form of an offer by Vellakutti to the company, undertaking to supply sugarcane grown in S. No. 15/3. It is plain -that there would not have been such an offer but for the fact that Vellakutti had a right to the produce from the lands therefrom. It is (sic)aot the case of the petitioner that he had either sold the sugarcane to Vellakutti or that the latter was his agent. I must therefore take it that the document. Ex. P. 1, is consistent only with the respondent's case of there having been a sub -lease of the property by the petitioner in favour of Vellakutti. The question then is -and indeed, this was the second point which was argued by Mr. Srinivasavaradachari - whether the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant for the reason that he had sub -let the property to another. In Venkatarama Iyer v/s. Asan Md. Rowther, (1961) 2 M.L.J. 277=74 L.W. 795, Srinivasan J. held that, under the provisions of S. 3 (2) (b) read with Ss. 4 (a) and (b) of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Act, a tenant who sub -leases the land will be liable for eviction for that very reason. Mr. Srinivasavaradachari sought to distinguish that case on the ground that the tenant in that case subleased the entirety of his holding, whereas in the present case the tenant had sub -leased only one of the three items. I am unable to find any distinction in principle between a case where a cultivating tenant grants a sub -lease of the entirety of the holding and that where he grants a part of that alone. In either case, he would cease to cultivate the land personally, at least with respect to a portion. That, undoubtedly, would entitle the landlord to seek eviction.
(2.) It is however contended that, by merely granting a sublease, a tenant cannot be said to have been guilty of any negligence which is destructive of, or injurious to the land or of any crop thereon, and that no right of eviction could accrue to the landholder thereby. But S.3 (2) (b) covers a case where a tenant had altogether ceased to cultivate the land. The definition of the term "cultivating tenant" and the scheme of the Act in regard to the protection given to such a tenant make it clear that the tenant should carry on personal cultivation on the land. When a tenant sub -leases the land, it cannot be said that he is personally cultivating the land in respect of the land sub -leased. He would, on the other hand, have altogether ceased to cultivate the land so sublet. I am in respectful agreement with the decision of Srinivasan J. in Veakatarama Iyer v/s. Asan Md. Rowther, (1961) 2 M.L.J. 277=74 L.W. 795, and I would even hold that, even if a cultivating tenant grants a sublease of a part of what has been demised to him, he would be liable for eviction under the provisions of S.3 (2) (b) read with S. 4. The Revenue Court has, as I stated earlier, restricted the eviction only to S. 15/3. I cannot see how the right of landlord to evict the tenant can be so restricted. Lease of the three items of property in the instant case was a single and indivisible one. If the tenant had sublet only one of the three items demised, it cannot mean that the Revenue Court will have an authority to split up the lease and direct possession only in regard to that part of the land In respect of which the cultivating tenant had ceased to cultivate, and recognise his right, in regard to the other parts of the land. Such a view will undoubtedly lead to considerable hardship, if not to complications. The lease being one and entire, a cesser of personal cultivation in regard to any part thereof will entail eviction from the entirety of the land demised. In that view, I consider that the order of the lower Court has got to be modified by directing the eviction of the tenant from the entire holding.
(3.) C. R. P. No. 1205 of 1962 is dismissed, while C R. P. No. 1952 of 1962 is allowed with costs.