C.P. CHIDAMBARAM, TRUSTEE NELLI, AYYANGAR KOIL, VADAGUDI, TIRUPPATTUR,TALUK, RAMANATHAPURAM DT. Vs. THE STATE OF MADRAS, REPRESENTED BY THE COLLECTOR OF RAMANATHAPURAM, MADURAI, AND OTHERS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This appeal is directed against the order of the Tribunal constituted under Act XXX of 1956, allowing a review of an earlier order passed by the Tribunal in Review Application No. 70 of 1958 after excusing the delay in making the application. Review Appln. No. 70 of 1958 was filed by the appellant herein under S. 3 of the above enactment for a declaration that the village of Nelliyandal was not an estate within the meaning of S. 3 (2) (d) of the Madras Estates Land Act, 1908. Certain ryots were made parties to the application. The State was also represented before the Tribunal. On 4th July 1958, when the application came up for hearing, the ryots did not press their objection to the village being declared as not being an estate. The Counsel who appeared for the Government did not also object to the Tribunal granting a declaration in terms prayed for by the appellant herein. Accordingly, a declaration was granted that Nelliyandal was not an estate. Sometime there after, the State preferred an application to the Tribunal to review its order dated 4th July 1958 on the ground that Nelliyandal was itself part of a major village of Vadagudi which had been earlier notified as an inam estate. There was a delay of 170 days in making the application for review and another application was filed to have that delay excused. In the meantime, the compensation amount for Vadagudi had been deposited before the Tribunal. It is stated that the landholder had drawn out the amount. It is not, however, very clear from the order of the Tribunal whether the landholder of the main village drew the compensation amount or whether the appellant too had drawn any portion thereof. That matter has got to be investigated by the Tribunal when it gets back the proceedings on remand, which we propose to make by this order. In case the Tribunal finds that the appellant too had received the compensation money, It will have to investigate the further question whether the appellant can thereafter sustain his application, for a declaration of Nelliyandal village as not being an estate. But, to continue the narrative, the Tribunal found that Nelliyandal was a hamlet of Vadagudi village and that there was sufficient cause for a review of its previous order. Excusing the delay in making the application for review, the Tribunal rectified its original order and rejected the appellant's application which sought for a declaration that Nelliyandal was not an estate.

(2.) In this appeal, Mr. F. Gopalaswami Ayyangar appearing for the appellant, contended that the Tribunal had no power to review its order, and that, in any event, it had no power to excuse the delay in making the application for review. As regards the first question, the rules make it clear that the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code will apply; under the rules a power to review orders has also been specifically conferred upon the Tribunal. The only question then is whether the Tribunal would have the jurisdiction to excuse any delay in the presentation of an application for review of its order. It would have such jurisdiction if the provisions of S. 5 of the Limitation Act were held to apply. The Madras Estates Abolition Act is undoubtedly a special law coming within S. 29 of the Indian Limitation Act. But there is no special period of limitation provided under the Act for an application by way of review. S. 29 (2) of the Limitation Act states:

(3.) This as we said is a case in which the special or local law, viz., the Abolition Act, has not prescribed any period of limitation much less one different from the period prescribed by the First Schedule. By implication, therefore, the provisions of the Limitation Act should be held to apply, the proceedings of the Tribunal being substantially regulated by the Code of Civil Procedure. It is well known that the Code of Civil Procedure and the Indian Limitation Act are two enactments relating to procedure in pari materia enacted at or about the same time one supplementing the other. If, therefore, It were to be held that the Code of Civil Procedure were substantially to apply to the proceedings under the Abolition Act and there is no special period of limitation fixed thereunder the provisions of the Limitation Act should be applied unless excluded either expressly or by implication. Sub -S. 2(a) of S. 29, which refers to only particular provisions of the Limitation Act as applying to special enactment, Will have application only where the special or local law prescribes any particular period of limitation different from those provided under the Limitation Act. In a case like the present, where no different period of limitation has been prescribed, the entirety of the Limitation Act will have to be applied, if it were not inconsistent with the nature of the applications contemplated under the special enactment. We are of opinion therefore that S. 5 of the Limitation Act will apply to proceedings under the rules enacted under the Abolition Act in so far as they are not inconsistent with the Ss. under the Act. To give an example, where that provision should be held to be excluded we can refer to applications for payment out of compensation by a creditor of the landholder under S. 42 of the Estates Abolition Act. An application to excuse the delay in such cases cannot be entertained after the prescribed time by the Tribunal, as the statute itself prescribed the time for such applications and Sub -S. 2 thereof further says that the right of the applicant to proceed against compensation money will cease on the expiry of the period specified in the section. Apart from those cases, in regard to other applications we are of opinion that there should be a power in the Tribunal to excuse the delay. The substantial objection of the appellant to the order of the Tribunal therefore fails. But this does not dispose of the matter in its entirety. It may be that Nelliyandal village is a hamlet, but still not an estate. Mr. Gopalaswami Aiyangar's case before us is that it is a pre -settlement minor inam in the village of Vadagudi that had been granted. Vadagudi is a zamindari estate. The contention of the learned Counsel is that, being a pre -settlement minor inam, it would not be an estate. This is a matter that has not been investigated by the Tribunal. While agreeing therefore with the Tribunal that it was competent and proper for it to set aside its previous order dated 4th July, 1959, we are of opinion that Rev. Appln. No. 70 of 1958 could not be disposed of without considering two further matters, namely, (1) whether Nelliyandal is a pre -settlement inam or otherwise is one which could not be regarded as an estate and (2) whether the appellant had received any portion of the compensation amount, and, if so whether he would be precluded from claiming the declaration under S. 3 that Nelliyandal is not an estate. The matter is therefore remitted to the Tribunal for further disposal in R.A.P. No. 70 of 1958 in the light of the observations made herein. There will be no order as to costs.