MUTHIAH MUTHIRIAN Vs. VAIRAPERUMAL MUTHIRIAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) This is a case in which the maternal uncle alleged as a complainant that bis nephew had stolen from him two ear-rings and cash of Rs, 4810-0-9. The prosecution mainly relied upon a confessional statement recorded Under Section 27, Evidence Act which is stated to have been made by the nephew. The appellate Court found that this confessional statement could not be accepted as it exceeded the limits of admissibility laid down in the Privy Council decision of ' Kotayya v. Emperor', AIR 1947 PC 67 (A) and the Madras cases of - 'Vodde Nagappa In re', AIR 1948 Mad 104(2) (B); - 'Public Prosecutor v. Voor Gounden', AIR 1948 Mad 242 (C); - 'In re Vellingiri', (D) - 'In re Sheikh Khadir Sahib', (E) and that there were several circumstances in this case like the uncle not coming forward with the complaint at the earliest possible time and the improbability of a nephew stealing the property of his uncle etc. creating considerable doubt and reversed the trial Magistrate's conviction giving the accused the benefit of doubt. A revision petition was filed in the High Court. Here my learned brother Somasunda-ram J. refused to interfere with the acquittal and confined the revision only to the disposal of stolen property which was the subject-matter of the case. In regard to this the uncle wants the return of the property and the nephew contests it. Therefore, what has to be done now in the matter of disposal of property is the point for consideration.

(2.) In normal circumstances, on acquittal or discharge the property would be returned to the person from whom it was seized: - 'Karup-pannan Ambalam v. Guruswami Pillai', AIR 1933 Mad 434 (2) (F); - 'In re Subba Raidu', Am 1922 Mad 329 (G); - 'Vadalapatta Sub-bayya v. Ponnangy Narasayya', /2 Weir 673 (H); - 'In re Syed Mohideen Sahib', 2 Weir 667 (668) (I). But when there are circumstances showing that the culprit has not claimed the property as his specifically and when there are also no grounds to hold that the property could belong to him, and the ques-tion of ownership has not been gone into in the judgment and decided one way or the other and the discharge or acquittal is based upon inadequacy or doubtfulness of the proof offered, it would be unreasonable to return the stolen property to the accused person.

(3.) But a Criminal Court, as well pointed out in the exhaustive analysis in Chitaley and Annaji Rao's Criminal Procedure Code, Vol. III, 4th (1950) Edn. at page 2862, is not expected, under the provisions of Section 517 to "try" civil cases. It is not the function of a criminal Court to decide nice questions involving principles of civil law, if there is a dispute between rival parties claiming a return of the property. It should not help a party whose object is to endeavour to obtain its judgment upon a question which ought to be determined in a civil Court. Where, therefore, there is a "doubt as to ownership" of property, or where a "question of bona fide title" by purchase or otherwise arises, the duty of the criminal Court is to leave the parties to their remedy in a civil suit. In the meanwhile, the criminal Court may adopt any one of the following modes of disposal: