(1.) This writ petition has been directed against the impugned award dated 31.10.2006 passed in I.D. No. 208 of 1998 by the First Additional Labour Court, Chennai, in and by which the Labour Court has held that the petitioner was not entitled to any relief from the second respondent, as the resignation letter dated 7.11.97 sent by the petitioner was accepted by the General Manager of the second respondent on the same day. Assailing the correctness of the award, Mr. R. Rajaram, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that after the petitioner entered the service in the second respondent-Management in the year 1994 as Stores Assistant, his services were confirmed on 4.4.97 by the second respondent. As there was no complaint whatsoever against the petitioner, all of a sudden, the Store Officer called him on 30.9.97. When the petitioner, accordingly, met the Store Officer Mr. K.B. Lawrence, he informed the petitioner that he had received information to the effect that the petitioner along with Mr. Arulmoli and Mr. Anandan had received a sum of Rs. 5,000/- each as illegal gratification from one of the company's client Jeethmull Jaichand Lal. Although the petitioner gave a statement in writing that he was not aware of any such incident, again, the petitioner was asked to meet the Deputy General Manager, on 7.11.97. After meeting the Deputy General Manager, the petitioner was informed to give a letter of resignation, failing which he would be handed over to the police for having received the illegal gratification from the customer. In view of the threat exerted on him to write the resignation letter as dictated by Mr. M.G. Narayanasamy, the petitioner, left with no other option, gave the said letter. Immediately, on 10.11.97, the petitioner posted his letter dated 8.11.97, withdrawing the resignation, followed by a lawyer's notice dated 8.11.97, by registered post with acknowledgment due. Although the second respondent had received both the letters on 11.11.97, in law, the petitioner's resignation letter dated 7.11.97 forcibly obtained by the Deputy General Manager stood withdrawn, for the reason that in the petitioner's appointment order dated 3.2.97, the terms and conditions of employment are clearly given and one of the conditions shows that after confirmation in service, either party will be entitled to terminate the contract of employment by giving one month notice in writing to the other. Therefore, when one month notice in the case of employees who have been confirmed in service is mandatory for both the employee and employer to terminate the contract of employment, the letter of resignation dated 7.11.97 stood withdrawn, inasmuch as there is no provision for payment of one month pay in lieu of notice or power to waive the said notice period. When the one month notice period is mandatory, the alleged letter of resignation dated 7.11.97 received at threat by the second respondent would legally come into effect only on 7.12.97. As the second respondent gets the right either to accept or reject the petitioner's offer of resignation only after 7.12.97, because, during the notice period of thirty days, the employee has got every right to withdraw his resignation, while so, when the petitioner had already withdrawn his resignation on 8.11.97, which was received by the second respondent on 11.11.97, the theory of acceptance of the petitioner's resignation by the second respondent on 7.11.97 itself has no legal effect, for the simple reason that the second respondent has no right to accept the resignation before the expiry of thirty days mandatory notice period.
(2.) Adding further, Mr. Rajaram contended that it is a well settled legal position that the acceptance of resignation will come into effect only after it is communicated to the employee. Similarly, it is also well settled that the employee also has got the right to withdraw his resignation before the date of acceptance of the resignation being communicated to him. Therefore, even if the employer accepts the request for resignation, before the communication of the acceptance of resignation reached or was received by the employee, if the employee had already withdrawn his resignation, the alleged acceptance of the resignation will have no legal effect, resultantly, the petitioner will be deemed to be in service. Therefore, by no stretch of imagination, it can be stated that the petitioner had left the service of the second respondent on the strength of settlement of the salary dues. Adding further, it was submitted that when the second respondent, after obtaining the alleged resignation letter by force, refused to allow him to perform his duty, the petitioner raised an industrial dispute under Section 2-A(2) of the Industrial Disputes Act. But, unfortunately, he pleaded, the first respondent-Labour Court dismissed the dispute raised by the petitioner, on the ground that he had failed to prove that the letter of resignation dated 7.11.97 was obtained under coercion and duress, by reaching a wrong conclusion that the resignation letter was accepted on 7.11.97 itself, although the letter withdrawing the resignation was received by the second respondent only on 11.11.97. Therefore, the Labour Court has wrongly concluded that the resignation came into effect on 7.11.97 itself. The said approach, he further pleaded, is legally defective.
(3.) Finally, it was submitted that the sequence of events and the circumstantial evidence would clearly go to prove that the resignation letter dated 7.11.97 was not a voluntary one, as it was obtained by the Deputy General Manager by threat, coercion and duress, for the reason that when the petitioner was asked to meet the Deputy General Manager on 7.11.97 and it has been the grievance of the petitioner that on the very same day, the Deputy General Manager obtained, by undue influence and threat, the resignation letter. Subsequently, the further event of posting his letter of withdrawal dated 8.11.97 on 10.11.97 by registered post with acknowledgment due goes to show that the petitioner had withdrawn his resignation within one month before the expiry of the notice period. All these vital aspects have been completely lost sight of by the first respondent-Labour Court, when it is an admitted fact that the said alleged letter accepting the resignation was posted only on 15.11.97 and it was also received only on 16.11.97 by the petitioner. But, much before 15.11.97, the petitioner had established the fact that he sent the withdrawal letter dated 8.11.97 on 10.11.97, which was admittedly received by the second respondent on 11.11.97. Pleading further, the learned counsel contended that when the law is well settled that every employee is entitled to withdraw the letter of resignation before the same was accepted by the employer and in the present case, as per the terms of the order of appointment, the petitioner is also legally entitled to withdraw the resignation, if made, within the expiry of one month notice period, the theory of acceptance of the resignation on 7.11.97 itself falls to the ground. Concluding his submission, it was also pleaded that even if it is presumed that the petitioner sent his resignation on 7.11.97, as he had already withdrawn his resignation on the very next day i.e., 8.11.97, it goes without saying that his resignation stood withdrawn, for the simple reason that after posting the letter on 10.11.97, the second respondent admittedly received the same on 11.11.97, therefore, the statutory obligation of one month notice having not expired, before 6.12.97, the non-employment of the petitioner would amount to termination of his service. Therefore, he is entitled for reinstatement in service with back wages, continuity of service and all other attendant benefits, irrespective of the fact that the second respondent had settled the dues towards full and final settlement, as it was forcibly thrust upon him to give the colour of voluntary resignation.