(1.) AS the facts leading to all the writ petitions are identical, they are disposed of by this common order.
(2.) LEARNED counsel appearing for the petitioners submitted that the petitioner in all the writ petitions joined the services of the second respondent management in June 1994. While they were in service, the second respondent had taken all steps to close down the factory without obtaining prior permission from Competent Authority. Although, by filing an application, the Management sought for retrenchment of employees, after the dismissal of the said application, they filed an application for closure of the factory under Section 25(o) of the Industrial Disputes Act in December, 2002. Unfortunately, the Government did not pass any order within a period of three months, hence, the prayer sought for in the application deemed to have been granted under the deemed clause. Taking advantage of the deemed clause, the third respondent Management declared that the Textool Company Limited, Machinery Division would be closed on and from 31.03.2002. Aggrieved by the closure order, the petitioners' Union challenged the same on various grounds before this Court in W.P.No.11354 of 2002, wherein this Court directed the Industrial Tribunal to consider whether the closure of the industry was valid or not, with a further direction to implead all the unions in the reference. Pleading further, it was stated that the Industrial Tribunal after considering various records, came to the conclusion that the closure of the factory was not required and thereupon a finding was given that the application made by the management for closure lacked bonafide. In view of that, the petitioners and some other employees insisted upon an employment with the second respondent management, but, the claim of the petitioners was resisted on the ground that the Union had already entered into the settlement reached under Section 12(3) of the Act, therefore, the said settlement would be binding upon the petitioners. Further, it was pointed out to the management that they could not take a different stand before the conciliation officer, as the management of the third respondent had already informed the (Board for Industrial and Financial reconstruction) BIFR / fourth respondent to take over all the workmen along with the assets of the second respondent. Under these circumstances, when the management refused to provide with employment to the petitioners, they have filed an application before the first respondent. But, the first respondent, without even ascertaining the application, rejected the application holding that it was not maintainable. Since the reason given by the first respondent is per-se illegal, the petitioners have filed the present writ petitions challenging the same.
(3.) PER contra, learned counsel appearing for the respondents 2 and 3 submitted that the petitioners have suppressed the actual and vital facts with a view to mislead the Court and that the petitioners have come to the Court with unclean hands by making false allegations and therefore, they are guilty of suppressio veri suggestio falsi. It was further contended that the impugned communication of the first respondent was in accordance with law and based on the facts and circumstances of the case, therefore, the allegation of the petitioners that they were the member of CITU was a false one. It was the Textool workers and staff union, who represented the case of the petitioners in the proceedings before the Tribunal in I.D.No.23 of 2002, before this Court in W.P.No.36888 of 2002 and in the subsequent settlement dated 12.04.2003, hence, the petitioners are bound by the closure of operation of law, pursuant to the settlement dated 12.04.2003 and therefore, having been a member of Textool Workers and Staff Union, the petitioners cannot now blow hot and cold to suit their conveniences against the law.