B G GURUPATHAM Vs. STATE ADMINISTRATIVE TRIBUNAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner herein challenges the order of the Tamil Nadu Administrative Tribunal (hereinafter called as the Tribunal) in the Contempt Application No.564/1994, whereby the Tribunal practically set aside the earlier order passed on 3.12.1993 in O.A.No.570/1990.

(2.) In this case the facts are rather peculiar. The petitioner who was working as Deputy Superintendent of Police, was suspended on 6.3.78 for some irregularities. A Departmental Enquiry was ensued and he was ordered to be dismissed on 3.9.1981. He, thereafter filed a Writ Petition before this court in W.P.No.353/1982, which came to be allowed on 4.2.1988 holding that the dismissal as also the findings of the enquiry officer were incorrect and that the petitioner was entitled to be exonerated of all the charges. The age of retirement at the time when the petitioner was suspended was 55 years, as per which, the petitioner would have been superannuated by 30.9.1978. However, since he was suspended he was not allowed to retire and was retained in the service till 3.9.1981, when he was ordered to be dismissed. However, in the mean time, on 25.4.1979 by a G.O. the age of retirement was extended from 55 to 58, according to which the petitioner would have had the advantage of three more years since he was in service. Then, if that advantage was available to him, he would have retired on 30.9.1981. Since the Government did not pay him his back wages, the petitioner filed O.A.No.570/90 and that came to be allowed on 3.12.1992. In that O.A. the petitioner had sought the salary from the date of suspension that is 6.3.78 to the date of dismissal that is 3.9.1981 and had also sought for interest at 18% p.a. This O.A. came to be allowed with the following directions:

(3.) Mr.A.Jeenasenan, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner points out that the order passed by the Tribunal in O.A.No.570/90 had attained finality, as it throughout remained unchallenged. He further argues that there was no question of any dearth of jurisdiction in the Tribunal when the Tribunal passed an order in O.A.570/90. It was not as if the subject matter was beyond the jurisdiction of the Tribunal's powers. The learned counsel therefore argues that the Tribunal had perfect jurisdiction to pass the order. If that order remained, it was an order within the jurisdiction of the Tribunal which remained unchallenged and became final against the Government. Then, it was bound to be complied with and the non-compliance thereof, would certainly has resulted in the contempt of court on the part of the Government and it was precisely the cause for the petitioner to move the contempt application before the Tribunal. Learned counsel would further contend that under such circumstances under its contempt jurisdiction, the Tribunal could not have annulled or invalidated the order earlier passed by it. Learned counsel argues that rightly or wrongly, an order came to be passed which was binding against the Government and its non-compliance was patently contemptuous and therefore, the Tribunal which was approached subsequently for the contempt of court could not have invalidated the order.