SETTU Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The order dated 21.10.2002 passed by the District Magistrate and District Collector, Vellore branding one Settu S/o. Kulandayappan as a "Bootlegger" and directing his detention under Section 3 of the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) is in challenge. The said Settu was found to have been involved in three prohibition cases, as also in the incident dated 01.10.2003, wherein he was found to be selling distilling country arrack, which was, ultimately, found to be mixed with atropine.

(2.) Learned counsel for the petitioner raises a very interesting point, which goes to the root of the matter and hence, we need not consider the other facts. Learned counsel invites our attention to page 35 of the documents supplied. On that page is an order refusing to grant bail. That order is dated 11.10.2002. The last paragraph of the order reads as under:- " The learned Public Prosecutor has objected to release the petitioner on bail by stating that C.E's report has been received, wherein it is stated that the seized contraband of arrack contains atrophinea poisonous substance to the extent of 6.00 mgms per 100 M.L and likely to be detained under B.L.Act" Learned counsel states that in common parlance when a person is detained under the provisions of Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders, Forest Offenders, Goondas, Immoral Traffic Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14 of 1982) on the ground that he is a bootlegger, it is normally referred to as "B.L Act".

(3.) He, further, points out from the language of the grounds that the detaining authority has taken into consideration the fact that a bail application was filed by the detenu before the Court of District Sessions Judge, Vellore vide Crl.M.P.No.4942/2002, and the same was dismissed on 11.10.2002 by the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Vellore. Learned counsel points out that it is the same bail application regarding which the order has been supplied to the detenu and direct reference to that order has been made by the detaining authority in his detention order, which would go to suggest that the said order was actively considered by the detaining authority before coming to the conclusion of passing a detention order. Learned counsel, therefore, poses a question as to how is it that a representation was made to the Court on the basis of the instructions received from the sponsoring authority that the detenu was "likely to be detained" under B.L. Act. Learned counsel, further, argues that if this was taken into consideration, then the detaining authority would be presumed to have known that the sponsoring authority had made a confident statement during his instructions to the Additional Public Prosecutor that the detenu was "likely to be detained" and therefore, the detaining authority was bound to take into consideration this impression, or as the case may be a confident notion on the part of the sponsoring authority, while passing the detention order. Learned counsel buttresses his argument that on this date i.e., 11.10.2002 when probably the instructions were given by the sponsoring authority to the Additional Public Prosecutor, the sponsoring authority had not even made a proposal by making an affidavit before the detaining authority. A doubt was, therefore, liable to be raised, as to whether there was already a plan to detain the detenu and the subsequent decision was merely a mechanical confirmation of that plan.