MARIA RONIKKAM Vs. ARULDASS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioners are the alienees and the legal representatives of the alienees from defendants 1 and 2 in O.S.No. 102 of 1973. THE respondent was the plaintiff. THE plaintiff is the son of the second defendant. THE first defendant is the paternal uncle of the second defendant. After the death of the respondent's father, the second defendant married her husband's brother namely the first defendant. THE defendant claimed that he was entitled to half share in the plaint schedule property and the first def endant was entitled to the remaining half share; and that to defeat the rights of the plaintiff, the defendants 1 and 2 had alienated the suit schedule properties without legal necessity. THE respondent claimed that the sale deeds executed in favour of the defendants 3 to 5 who are the petitioners herein are void. THE defendants 1 and 2 remained ex parte , the alienees viz., the defendants 3 to 5 are the contesting parties. THE defendants 3 to 5 claimed that the respondent got only one-third share in the suit properties and not half share. This was not accepted by the Trial Court. THE Trial Court held that the parties are governed by the Travancore Cochin Christian Succession Regulation and the provisions of the Indian Succession Act are not applicable and declared that the respondent and the first defendant were entitled to one-half share each in the suit properties.

(2.) THE appeal filed there against was dismissed and the Second Appeal No. 1117 of 1983 was also dismissed on 11.8. 1998. THE substantial question of law that was framed for consideration in the second appeal was whether the Courts below were wrong in applying Section 30 instead of 60 of the Limitation Act to the facts of the case. No other point was raised.

(3.) ACCORDING to Mr. Raghavachari, learned counsel for the petitioner the petitioners are in a better position because even before the execution petition they have filed the review. May be. But the difficulty here is one of merger. The judgment and decree of the Trial Court had merged with the decree in the second appeal.