TIRUCHIRAPALLI HIRUDAYAPURAM CO Vs. JOINT REGISTRAR OF CO

JUDGEMENT

(1.) There are certain broad features common to these cases. There may be features peculiar and distinct to some of these cases, but they have no relevance at all for purpose of deciding the question that gets posed before us. There were settlements arrived at in the course of conciliation proceeding and otherwise than in the course of conciliation proceedings under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter referred to as 'the Act', fitting in with Sections 12(3) and 18(1) of the Act, as the cases may be. All the formalities regarding such settlements, as per the pre-requisites of the Act, have been satisfied. The settlements were between the concerned co-operative societies on the one hand and their employees on the other. The settlements concerned the wages structures for the employees in the Cooperative societies. In the settlements, the Cooperative societies were represented by the office bearers of the elected bodies who were in charge of the management of the co-operative societies. Only subsequently, the elected bodies have been dislodged and special officers have come into the picture. The contesting respondents raise ascertain queries concerning the propriety and validity of the settlements, but those queries are besides the provisions of the Act and they are in the other fields. It is claimed that the settlement were arrived at, in derogation of the specific instructions adumbrated in the circulars issued by the concerned Registrars under the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies Act 30 of 1983, hereinafter referred to as Act 30 of 1983. A stand is also taken that these settlements are the result of collusion between those who represented the cause of the management of the Societies and those who represented the cause of the employees. It is further contended that the settlements were not conducive to the financial interests of the Co-operative Societies and if they are to be implemented, they will undermine the financial stability of the Co-operative Societies. There is also a contention raised that the settlements are derogatory to the By-laws of the Co-operative Societies. What did happen in the present cases is that by a stroke of pen, by the issuance of the proceedings impugned in the writ petition, there is an endeavor to unilaterally nullify the settlements and ignore them. It would have been a different matter if the respondents have taken up cudgels by resorting to any process of law that may be available to them to achieve this end. That they have not done. It is true that the relevant point of time when the settlements were arrived at, the Societies were manned by elected bodies and those officer bearers of the elected bodies represented the cause of the management of the Co-operative Societies in arriving at the settlements. These has been a subsequent charge by the Tamil Nadu Co-operative Societies (Appointment of Special Officers) Act 30 of 1991 coming into force and the Special Officers getting hold of the management of the Co-operative Societies. But the tenure of the settlements has not yet lapsed and this is the admitted position. There is no gainsaying that the settlements arrived at shall be binding on the successors-in office of the Co-operative Societies. It will not be proper for this Court in the present proceeding to express any opinion with reference to the factors put forth by the respondents as vitiating the settlements and give an adjudication over them. We are only called upon to go into the legal propriety of the proceedings impugned in these cases whereby the settlements are sought to be nullified. Whatever be the nature of the factors alleged as vitiating the settlements, can the respondents by the proceedings impugned, give an adjudication over the settlement and unilaterally nullify them, is the question that alone comes up for consideration by us. Suffice it to point out that what the respondents have done is not only unorthodox, but also not fitting in with any precept of law. The respondents cannot by issuing the proceedings impugned, adjudicate over the settlements and unilaterally set at naught the settlements apparently fitting in with the provisions of the Act. There is a total lack of jurisdiction and competency in law in this regard. This factor alone, in our view, should weight with us for purposed of deciding these cases. There is no need for to travel beyond this.

(2.) Mr. K. Subramaniam, learned Advocate General, leading the learned, counsel for the contesting respondents, would endeavor to sustain the impugned proceedings by saying that they are issued pursuant to exercise of revisional powers under Sec. 153 of Act 30 of 1983 and the petitioners could as well participate in the proceedings proposed to justify any cause of theirs. First of all, by the verbalism of the impugned proceedings, there is no reference to Sec. 153 of Act 30 of 1983. Even otherwise, the said provision could not be availed of at all to review or revise a settlement arrived at under the Act. Such a settlement is not at all falling within the ambit of Sec. 153 of Act 30 of 1983. Learned Advocate-General would submit that there could be examination of the resolutions or the decisions of the Co-operative Societies authorising of the entering into such settlements pursuant to the exercise of power under Sec. 153 of Act 30 of 1983 and the Court must view the impugned proceedings as tending to achieve this end only. We are unable to accept this line of thinking. The matters have gone past the stage of bare resolutions or decisions, and settlements under the Act have been arrived at. Though the wordings in the impugned proceedings do not lend support to this theory, assuming that the same could be the endeavour by the contesting respondents, that would be totally unsustainable and an act of futility, for the simple reason that by adopting this process the settlement under the Act cannot be touched and deleted. We have not been enlightened of any legal lever or basis for contesting respondents to justify the impugned proceedings, when they purported to adjudicate over the settlements under the Act, so as to nullify them.

(3.) Learned counsel for the petitioners were anxious to suggest that the contesting respondents are not without remedy an they were suggesting different remedies. Mr. K. Chandru, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in some of the writ petitioners, would submit that the process under the Act could not be resorted to and only there could be an independent approach to this Court under Art. 226 of the Constitution of India. In contrast, Mr. A. L. Somayaji, learned counsel appearing for the petitioners in some of the writ petitioners would submit that the process under the Act is not excluded in a contingency like the present one. We make it clear that we are not in the field of making any suggestion as to what exactly is the process in law the respondents should resort to, to delete the settlements, if there are grounds justifying the same. It is sufficient if we take note that by the impugned proceedings that result could not be achieved. The impugned proceedings are incompetent and without jurisdiction. When we view the question from the above angle, we have no other alternative, but to countenance the grievances of the petitioners in these cases. Accordingly, in this batch of writ petitions, we make the following order : The proceedings impugned in the writ petitions in so far as the purport nullify or annual the settlements arrived at under the Act shall not be enforced to the prejudice of the petitioners. We make no order as to costs. We make it clear that we have only frowned upon the impugned proceedings in so far as they by themselves ventured to nullify or annual other settlements under the Act. It is certainly open to the authorities concerned to resort to the appropriate process available to them in law to achieve their end with regard to their grievances over the settlements. Feb. 12, 1992. Per Nainar Sundaram, Ag. CJ. and Somasundaram, J.:- We made a common order in this Batch on Feb. 12, 1992, wherein the question dealt with was with reference to the propriety and competency of the proceedings impugned in the writ petitions in so far as they purported to nullify and cancel the settlements arrived at under the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947. But subsequently, it has been noticed that in W.P. Nos. 3050, 3402, 3403, 5734, 9832, 6062, 3725 and 6449 of 1992, the question involved is not the one dealt with by the common order. That is why, the abovementioned writ petitions are coming up for being mentioned today. Accordingly, the said writ petitioners will stand deleted from the array in the cause title to the common order and the said common order shall not cover the above mentioned writ petitions.