N RAGHUNATHAN Vs. UNION OF INDIA UOI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE prayer in the Writ Petition is to issue a writ of certiorari to quash the order of the 3rd respondent dated April 8, 1983 terminating the services of the petitioner as probationary Development Officer.

(2.) THE 3rd respondent appointed the petitioner as an apprentice Development Officer under Life Insurance Corporation of India by the order dated January 21, 1982. The petitioner was first taken as apprentice for a period of one year commencing from February 1, 1982 and he was given training at Development Officer's Training Centre at Thanjavur. The petitioner underwent the said training for two months from February 1, 1982 to March 31, 1982. On completion of the theoretical training course at Thanjavur, the petitioner was posted to Dharmapuri Branch of the L. I. C. to undergo administration training. This training lasted one month. After the administration training was over, the petitioner was posted for field training under Dharmapuri branch with headquarters at Jalakandapuram. When the petitioner's period of apprenticeship ended on January 31, 1983 the petitioner must have been placed on probation from February 1, 1983. However, the 3rd respondent has not placed the petitioner on probation on the ground that the petitioner had not completed the target of Rs. 15 lakhs new business during the period from May 3, 1982 to December 31, 1982. On December 10, 1982, a notice was issued to the petitioner stating that if he does not complete the minimum requirement of Rs. 15 lakhs by December 31, 1982, the 3rd respondent may be compelled to terminate his apprenticeship effective from January 17, 1983. By the letter dated January 18, 1983 it was pointed out to the petitioner that his period of apprenticeship would end on January 31, 1983 and he cannot be placed on probation from February 1, 1983 unless sufficient progress is shown by him during his apprenticeship period. On February 1, 1983 the petitioner represented to the 3rd respondent stating that he had introduced business to the tune of Rs. 8. 5 lakhs and that given six more weeks, he would fulfil the target. Based on the report that the petitioner had introduced 107 proposals amounting to Rs. 15,14,500/- and activated 18 agents it was decided to place the petitioner on probation from February 1, 1983. The order appointing the petitioner as probationary Development Officer with effect from February 1, 1983 was issued on February 19, 1983 giving the terms and conditions under which he was placed under probation. On March 29, 1983 the third respondent issued a notice to the petitioner pointing out certain irregularities and directed the petitioner to submit his explanation on or before April 4, 1983. The notice dated March 29, 1983 reads as follows:-<FRM>JUDGEMENT_24_TLMAD0_1992Html1.htm</FRM> The petitioner submitted his explanation on April 4, 1983. Thereafter, on April 8, 1983, the 3rd respondent passed the impugned order terminating the services of the petitioner as probationary Development Officer. The order dated April 8, 1983 reads thus:<FRM>JUDGEMENT_24_TLMAD0_1992Html2.htm</FRM> The order dated April 8, 1983 is challenged in the present Writ Petition.

(3.) MR. N. G. R. Prasad, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended in the first place that on the date of the impugned order no doubt the petitioner was holding the post of probationary Development Officer and the impugned order of termination dated April 8, 1983 is ex facie an order of termination simpliciter. However, the learned counsel for the petitioner contended that the form of the order of termination or the language in which it is couched is not conclusive; when an allegation is made by the employee assailing the order of termination of services as one based on mis-conduct, though couched in innocuous terms, it is incumbent on the part of the Court to lift the veil to see the true nature of the order. The learned counsel heavily relied on the averments in the notice dated March 29, 1983 and submitted that in the said notice the petitioner was accused of certain irregularities and further it was alleged in the said notice that the petitioner had been trying to circumvent the conditions and earn his probation, by misrepresentation; such allegations amount to allegation of mis-conduct; the allegation of mis-conduct and grave irregularities alleged in the notice dated March 29, 1983 is the foundation of the impugned order, though it is worded as an order of termination simpliciter and therefore the order of termination amounted to punishment. The learned counsel for the petitioner also submitted that the order of termination of the services of the petitioner cannot be sustained if the foundation of the order of termination was an alleged mis-conduct on the part of the petitioner and if such order of termination involved a stigma to the petitioner. The further contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is that if the impugned order is considered as an order of punishment, then the removal of the petitioner from the service without holding an enquiry would violate Article 311 of the Constitution of India, and consequently the impugned order is liable to be quashed. In support of his contention, the learned counsel for the petitioner relied on: 1. Jarnail Singh v. State of Punjab (1986-11-LLJ-268) (SC ). 2. Om Prakash Goyal v. H. P. T. D. C. Ltd. , (1992-I-LLJ-469) (SC ).