N KRISHNAMURTHY Vs. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR BHEL TRICHY

JUDGEMENT

(1.) BY consent of parties, the writ appeal itself is taken up for disposal. This writ appeal has been preferred against the order passed in W. M. P. No. 7988 of 1992 in W. P. No. 5586 of 1992. In W. P. No. 5586 of 1992, the appellant has prayed for the issue of a writ of mandamus directing the respondents to issue the National Apprenticeship Certificate under Section 21 of the Apprenticeship Act, 1961, and for a direction to the respondent to provide appointment to the appellant in the Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd. , under Section 21 of the Apprentices Act. Pending the writ petition, the appellant in W. M. P. 7988 of 1992 obtained an order on July 22, 1992, directing the respondents to permit the appellant to continue to work in the N. M. R. vacancy in the 2nd respondent company at Ranipet until further orders. Subsequently, 2nd respondent filed W. M. P. No. 17051 of 1992 for vacating there interim direction granted on July 22, 1992. The learned Judge, in the course of the order in W. M. P. No. 17051 of 1992 (wrongly stated as in W. M. P. No. 7988 of 1992 in W. M. P. 17051 of 1992) referred to the direction prayed for by the appellant in the writ petition and Section 22 of the Apprentices Act as well as Clause 5 of the contract of Apprenticeship and found that it is not obligatory on the part of the respondents to offer any employment to the appellant and that the appellant was also not employed even as a casual labour at the time when the writ petition was filed, and therefore, he was not entitled to seek directions to the effect that he should continue to work in the N. M. R. vacancy. In the view so taken, the interim order passed in W. M. P. No. 7988 of 1992 was vacated and W. M. P. 17051 of 1992 was ordered. It is the correctness of the order so passed that is questioned in this appeal.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant strenuously contended that the National Apprenticeship Certificate, to which the appellant was entitled, had not been made available to him and that had resulted in the appellant losing employment opportunities and that should be made good by issuing a direction to the respondent to give employment to the appellant at least in the N. M. R. vacancy. We are, however, unable to accept this contention. We have already referred to the prayer of the appellant in the writ petition and even as per that, under Sec. 22 of the Apprentices Act, 1961, the appellant cannot ask for directions regarding employment under the respondents 1 and 2. Further, in this case, the agreement of apprenticeship entered into clearly shows that it was not obligatory on the art of either the appellant or even the employer respondents 1 and 2 to accept or offer any employment on the completion of the period of training. The respondents are thus under no obligation to offer employment, even after the completion of training as an apprentice. Thus as per Sec. 22 as well as the terms of the Contract of Apprenticeship, the appellant cannot claim that he should be provided with employment even in N. M. R. vacancy. It is further seen that the appellant was no doubt employed as a casual worker between January 12, 1988 and March 31, 1988 and between November 4, 1991 and March 31, 1992. Even that, in our view, would not give any right to the appellant to claim that he should be given employment. It has been clearly found that the appellant was not engaged as a casual employee when he moved the writ petition before this court or even when he obtained the order in W. M. P. No. 7988 of 1992 on July 22, 1992. Thus, looked at from any point of view, the appellant is not entitled to seek any employment under respondents 1 and 2 either under the provisions of the Apprentices Act or under the terms of the Contract of Apprenticeship or even otherwise. We entirely agree with the learned Judge that the appellant had not made out a case that he is entitled to seek a direction regarding his appointment in the 2nd respondent establishment. The writ appeal is dismissed. No costs.