G S NAIDU Vs. JACOB MANICKAM

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner, viz. , G. S. Naidu claiming to be the owner of the house situate at Door No. 37, Kannikaparameswari Koil Street, Vellore and also claiming to be in possession thereof came forward with the present action, invoking the inherent jurisdiction of this court under Sec. 482 Crl. P.C. impleading one Jacob Manickam the Sub-Inspector of Police, and one Ganesan , the Inspector of Police, Vellore (North) as respondents 1 and 2 stating that the said respondents, abusing their position as police officials locked the said premises forno reason whatever and even without any authority of law and took away the key and in such circumstances, he would say that the ends of justice would require this Court to pass a suitable order directing the respondents to hand over the key to him.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner Mr. V. Saira m would however make a vociferous argument the this Court is definitely having power under Sec. 43 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 (II 1974) in short the Code to order for the return the key as prayed for by the petitioner in the circumstances of the case. In amplification of the argument he would further say and lay so much of emphasis upon the pharseology , viz. , otherwise to secure the ends of justice occurring in Sec. 482 thereof and according to him the said pharcealogy does not restrict the power of this. Court to do anything, if the court derives satisfaction that what is asked for to be done. if done, will serve the ends of justice.

(3.) SO far as the second clause is concerned, viz. ,'to prevent abuse of the process of any court or otherwise to secure the ends of justice' is concerned, the same had been interpreted by an order dated 31. 1. 1991 by the division Bench of this Court consisting Mishra , J. and Govindasamy , J. in Crl. M. P. No. 64821 of 1990 and other batch of cases on a reference having been made and the Division Bench clearly expressed the view that the inherent power of this Court can be extended under this clause to prevent prejudice being caused to the cause of justice of an order emanating from the order of a Subordinate Court and not otherwise. Therefore, the second clause cannot be invoked in this case.