P PREMCHAND BANDHIA Vs. YASHBALA R PROHIT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS civil revision petition, at the instance of the tenant, has been preferred against the order of eviction passed against the petitioner, by the Appellate Authority, on an application taken out by the respondent herein, under Sec. l0 (3) (a) (i ) of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960 as amended by Act 23 of 1973 (hereinafter referred to as'the Act' ; ). Briefly stated, the circumstances giving rise to this C. R. P. , are as follows: The premises bearing door No. 60, Ellis Road , Madras-2, belongs to the respondent and the petitioner is in occupation of the first floor in that property, as a tenant, on a monthly rent of Rs. 625. The respondent was in occupation, as a tenant, of door No. 4, IV Cross Road, C. I. T. Colony, Madras-4, belonging to one Sri T. A. Ramachandra n and the furniture and other house-hold articles belonging to her, were kept in the rented premises, when the landlady was obliged to be away from Madras and the respondent as well as the other members of her family, stayed in the rented premises, whenever they were in Madras. In order to secure her own premises for her use and occupation, as she did not have any other residential premises of her own in the city of Madras, the respondent issued a notice to the petitioner on 16. 9. 1984 calling upon him to vacate and hand over vacant possession, for which, the petitioner sent a reply declining to comply with the demand. The respondent stated that she requires the premises in the occupation of the petitioner for her own use and occupation, viz. , residence for herself and other members of her family whenever they are at Madras and also for keeping her furniture and other household articles, valuables, etc. , and that she bona fide requires the first floor in the occupation of the petitioner for her own use and occupation. Accordingly, she prayed for an order of eviction against the petitioner under Sec. 10 (3) (a) ( i ) of the Act.

(2.) IN the counter filed by the petitioner, he put forward the plea that the petitioner was not residing as a tenant at Door No. 4, IV Cross Road , c. I. T. Colony, Madras -4 and further denied that the respondent did not own any other property in the city of Madras . That the respondent was bona fide in need of the building , was also denied by the petitioner. Stating that the respondent belongs to Gujarat and her husband was employed, in the Sultanate of Oman and she is permanently settled with her husband at Muscat , the petitioner questioned the bona fides of the requirement of the respondent and prayed for the dismissal of the eviction petition.

(3.) IN Abdul Ravoof v. The South INdian Tanners & Dealers Association, Ranipet , 76 L. W. 43 (S. N.), it was held that an application laid by a non-member paid secretary authorised by a resolution of the Executive committee of the Association, responsible for carrying on the administration, according to the objects of the Association to sign applications for eviction and to engage counsel for the conduct of proceedings before, the appropriate forums, was not in any way repugnant to the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act 18 of 1960, as the application was competently laid by the Secretary acting as the representative of the registered Society. IN Jameena Beevi v. Easwarlal Patel, (1979)2 M. L. J. 355. Ramprasada Rao , C. J. , had occasion to consider the question of the maintainability of an application filed by a power of attorney agent under the terms of the power of attorney, which enabled the agent to initiate proceedings for eviction of the tenants, fixation of fair rent, etc. , before the competent authorities. It was held that the definition of the word 'landlord'under Sec. 2 (6) of the Act, would include a power of attorney agent and so long as such agent was not merely an agent for collection of rent, proceedings in eviction could be initiated and that an undertaking given by the power of attorney in that case, satisfied the requirements of sec. l4 (2) (b) of the Act. It is thus seen from Secs. 2 (6)and 10 (8) of the Act as well as the Rules, that a general power of attorney agent, as in this case, duly empowered to initiate proceedings in eviction, can also sign and present applications for and on behalf of the principal and such an application cannot be said to be not maintainable for the reason that it has not been signed by the landlady herself. The signing of the application as well as the verification therein, by the general power of attorney, as in this case, cannot be regarded as a defect, which affects the jurisdiction of the controller to entertain the application. It would be useful in this connection to refer to Rajitram v. Kateswarnath , 18 All 396 (M), where a Full Bench of the Allahabad High Court observed that it would be difficult to imagine any case in which a defective verification of a plaint could affect the merits of the case or the jurisdiction of the Court. Again in Basdeo v. John Smidt , I. L. R. 22 All. 55 at 61, the learned Judges, quoted with approval the following passage from Mr. Venfleet's Law of Collateral Attack on Judicial Proceedings. 'the statutes require many kinds of petitions to be verified. This includes generally all complaints and petitions in special proceedings, the bill in equity, the libel in admiralty and in some States, complaints or petitions in all cases. Such verification adds no allegation to the pleadings and tenders no issue. Its only object is to show the good faith of the petitioner. . . . . Like any other formal merits, its absence is waived by a failure to object and if its entire absence does not affect the jurisdiction, of course, more defects in it cannot'. The observations to similar effect in A. S. Subbaraj v. M. Muthiah , (1953)2 M. L. J. 377: A. I. R. 1954 Mad. 336, may also be referred. Venkatarama Ayyar , J. dealing with the question of the need to dismiss an election petition for defective verification, took the view that defective verification is a mere irregularity and does not affect the jurisdiction of the court to entertain the proceeding, notwithstanding the fact that the rule provided that the verification shall be in the manner prescribed therein. Even on the footing that the application for eviction and the verification therein had been made by the general power of attorney and not the landlady, that would at best be a mere irregularity and would not in any manner affect the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller to entertain the petition. It is also significant that while the first part of Rule 11 (3) refers to signing by the applicant and his counsel, the latter part relating to presentation speaks of the same by the applicant himself personally or by his recognised agent. The difference in the language employed in the first and latter parts of the rule is also not without significance, as, in the latter part, the presentation should be by the applicant personally or by recognised agent, while, with reference to the signing by the applicant, it has not been stated that it should be signed personally by the applicant. IN other words, a general power of attorney agent, as in this case, when he signs the application for eviction, under Rule 11 (3) of the Rules, it shall be as good as having been signed by the applicant herself. Thus, on a due considerations of the provisions of the Act, the contents of the power executed by the landlady in favour of the agent and on the facts of this case, it cannot be said that there was any violation of Rule 11 (3) of the Rules framed under the Act and the application for eviction was rightly entertained.