P RADHAKRISHNAN Vs. DISTRICT COLLECTOR DINDIGUL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THESE two writ appeals are directed against the common order of the learned single Judge in two writ petitions preferred by the appellant. The appellant wanted writs of mandamus forbearing the respondents and their subordinates from interfering with the petitioner's right to quarry, remove the rough stones in blocks from the lands in question and to transport them to the place of his choice. The matter is governed by the Tamil Nadu Mineral Concession Rules, 1959, hereinafter referred to as the Rules. The notification, which preceded the holding of the auction, the proceedings relating to confirmation of auction and the ultimate lease deeds entered into and registered; all stipulated that the lessee shall produce only rough stones, jellies, stone pillars and plank stones which could be used for building and road works and the lessee shall not produce block stones dressed and undressed for any other purpose such as polishing and for export etc. The learned single Judge, after a considerable discussion of the points urged, did not countenance the claim of the appellant and dismissed the writ petitions.

(2.) MR.R.Krishnamoorthy, learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant, would submit that the Rules as such do not inhibit producing of block stones; and the lease deeds are not in conformity with the form prescribed under the Rules and the prescribed form does not contemplate a condition relating to inhibition for producing block stones. Learned senior counsel appearing for the appellant would contend that the Rules and the form thereunder are statutory in character and there cannot be a stipulation of terms besides those contemplated in the form. Merely because there is no express inhibition in the Rules, it does not mean that anything the appellant desires is permitted. What is not permitted expressly must be deemed to have been inhibited. Even if we go by the Rules, they are generously couched so as to be pliable to enter into lease deeds to meet situations according to facts and circumstances. The Rules and the forms thereunder are not rigid and inflexible in this regard and they do permit scope for settling terms according to the needs of the case. Further, the parties settled all their rights and obligations in the lease deeds and they must ultimately speak. The appellant never demurred earlier and on the other hand accepted the terms. It is not possible to enlarge the rights secured to the appellant under the lease deeds. We are not able to sustain the claim of the appellant to have more rights than what have been secured under the lease deeds. Accordingly, these two writ appeals are dismissed as lacking in merits. No costs.