VIVEKANANDA MIDDLE SCHOOL MUTHUKRISHNAPURAM KADAYANALLUR P O TIRUNELVELI DISTRICT Vs. STATE OF TAMIL NADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) SINCE the parties in both the appeals are more or less the same and they are interconnected, they are dealt with together.

(2.) THE appellant in these appeals is the Manager of a Middle School, called "Viveka-nanda Middle School" at Muthukrishnapuram, Kadayanallur, P.O., Tenkasi Taluk, Tiruveiveli District. In the said school there was a permanent Secondary Grade teacher by name M. Ramiah handling VIII standard. THE said teacher applied for leave from 1st September, 1976 to 30th September, 1976, on the production of medical certificate from Dr. Sailapathy of the Government Medical College Hospital Palayamkottai. On 1st October, 1976, he wanted to rejoin duty, but the management insisted on the production of a medical certificate that he was fit to rejoin duty. When such certificate was not produced, the management did not allow the teacher to join duty. On the ground that the management's action in not allowing him to join duty amounted to termination of his service, the teacher filed an appeal to the Chief Educational Officer, Tirunelveli, who allowed the appeal and directed the management to reinstate the teacher. As against the said order of the Chief Educational Officer, the management filed an appeal before the Education Tribunal, (Principal) Subordinate Judge, Tirunelveli, constituted under the Tamil Nadu Recognised Private Schools (Regulation) Act, 1973, hereinafter referred to as the Act. Since the said appeal was not accompanied by a deposit of the arrears of pay and allowances due to the teacher, the Tribunal called upon the management to deposit the amount by 10th August, 1978, as per its order dated 20th July, 1978. THE management wanted three weeks" time for payment. But even after the expiry of the said three weeks, the deposit was not made. THE Tribunal had made it clear by its order dated 20th July, 1978, that if the deposit was not made on or before 10th August, 1978, the appeal would stand dismissed. Since the deposit was not made, the Tribunal ultimately dismissed the appeal on 12th September, 1978.

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the appellant then contended that whatever might have happened earlier, the management is now prepared to deposit the full amount due to the teacher, provided the appeal is taken on file by the Tribunal and disposed of on merits. We are of the view that, having regard to the language used in section 44 (4) of the Act, the question of reopening the appeal proceedings, on the management depositing the amount now, does not arise. In the event of the management failing to deposit the amount as provided in sub-section (1) of section 44, the Tribunal shall stop all further proceedings and make an order directing the management to reinstate the teacher. If section 44 (4) merely enabled the Tribunal to stop all further proceedings, it is possible to construe that section as enabling the Tribunal to restore the proseedings on the deposit being made later and to deal with the same on merits. But since under section 44 (4) of the Act, the Tribunal is not only enjoined to stop all further proceedings but also direct the management to reinstate the teacher, the said provision cannot be construed as enabling the Tribunal to restore the proceedings on deposit being made at a subsequent stage and at any later point of time. If, on the other hand, the intention of the Legislature is to enable the Tribunal to restore the proceedings at any later point of time on deposit being made by the management, then there will be a specific provision to that effect to enable the Tribunal to vacate its earlier order stopping all further proceedings and directing reinstatement of the teacher. But so long as such specific provision is not there, the Tribunal which makes a (positive order directing the management to [reinstate a teacher cannot recall that order and restore the appeal to file and proceed with the (same on merits, if the management chooses to deposit the amount at a later point of time. This contention of the appellant is not therefore tenable.