(1.) Mr.Jamal Mohamed, learned counsel for the petitioners says that he is authorised to sign on behalf Chandran, Kuppammal, Pichandiammal and Raniammal and they have not signed in the compromise memo. The signatures of Rajalakshmi Ammal, the first respondent, Venkatesan, 2nd petitioner and the left thumb impression of Krishna Naidu, the 1st petitioner are found. As already seen, the signatures of petitions 3 to 6 namely, Chandran, Kuppammal, Pichandiammal and Raniammal are not found. They have not signed, Mr.Jamal Mohamed, learned counsel submits that under Order 23, Rule 3, this Court for sufficient reasons can record the compromise if the learned counsel for the petitions has signed on behalf of the petitioners. This Court is now bent upon the presence of all the parties and the signatures of all the parties in the joint memo especially when it is now disputed by one Bakthavatchalal Naidu, the second respondent in C.R.P.No.2334/80 that he had purchased the property in question in Court auction for Rs.32,000/-. Rajalakshmi Ammal who has signed the joint memo submits that her property worth about Rs.21,000/- has been alienated. But these are all matters to be decided in the final disposal of these two civil revisions petitions which have now been brought on record by setting aside the order of dismissal for default with costs.
(2.) Now let me just observe as to what is the scope of Order 23, Rule 3, C.P.C. with regard to memo compromise, Order 23, Rule 3, reads as follows :-
(3.) Under the rule as it stood prior to its amendment, a decree could be passed only so far as the compromise relates to the suit. But a compromise which includes matters extraneous to the suit was not unlawful (vide Harak Chandas v. Hyderabad State Bank Mst . Hulasi v. Mohanlal (ILR 1960) 10 Raj 94), Harichand v. Mahimal (AIR 1917 Lah 282 92)); Smt. Susila Devi V. Girdharilal (ILR 1972-1 Delhi 867) and could not be rejected in its entirety by the Court. (vide Harak Chandas v. Hyderabad State bank Where a compromise comprised mater unconnected with the suit, it was held that the proper course for the Court was to recite the compromise as a whole in its decree or in the form of a schedule to the decree for purpose of reference but to restrict the operative part of the decree to those terms of the compromise which related to the suit. In such a case the decree would be executable only in respect of matters that related to the suit. (vide Munshi Ram v. Banwarilal : Hemanta Kumari v. Zamindari Co. (AIR 1919 PC 79), Chandrasekar v. Ukiabati Bimal Kumar V. Amiya Gopal The remaining terms of the compromise, i.e., those which were not incorporated in the operative part of the decree, might be enforced by means of a separate suit. (Vide Haran Chandas v. Hyderabad State Bank and Balesar Misir v. Tekesar Misir (AIR 1939 All 454).