D RUKMANI AMMAL Vs. V K IZUDDEN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE landlords within the meaning of the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act (XVIII of 1960), hereinafter referred to as .the Act. are the petitioners in this revision. THE respondent herein is the tenant within the meaning of the Act. THE landlords sought the eviction of the tenant under section 14 (1) (6) of the Act on the ground that they bona fide required the premises demised for demolition and reconstruction. THE tenant contested the petition of the landlords and yet, the Controller countenanced the case of the landlords and ordered eviction of the tenant. THE tenant appealed and the appellate authority discountenanced the case of the landlords on two grounds, namely, (1) the premises desmised consisted of two door numbers and a single petition for eviction would not lie and (2) the landlords have not proved their means to undertake the work of demolition and reconstruction. THE other points have been found in favour of the landlords by the appellate authority the appellate authority found that the landlords are armed with a sanctioned plan from the Corporation of Madras for the work of demolition and reconstruction and the existing condition of the premises bear out the bona fide requirement of the landlords for demolition and reconstruction.

(2.) MR. V. Avudainayagam, learned counsel appearing for the landlords, would submit that the appellate authority, on the two points found against the landlords, has not applied the correct principles governing them and on this ground, the learned counsel would solicit interference in revision by this Court. There is no doubt that as on the relevant date, the premises demised consisted of two door numbers, one is Door No. 77 (old No. 212), Triplicane High Road, Madras-600005, and the other is Door No. 7 (old No. 1/48), First Floor, Khanabagh Street, First Lane, Triplicane, Madras-600005. Originally, Door No. 77, Triplicane High Road, alone was the subject-matter of demise and subsequently, the tenant has been inducted into possession in the upstairs of Door No. 7, Khanabagh Street, First Lane. There is a deed of lease dated 7th September, 1960. This deed covered both the door numbers. By this deed, the lease given was a single lease. Both the door numbers were treated as a single unit with regard to the terms governing the lease. Only one rent per month was stipulated. The landlords relied on Exhibit P-11, the report of a retired Assistant Engineer in the Corporation of Madras. It shows that Door No. 7, Khanabagh Street, First Lane, is directly abutting Door No. 77, Triplicane High Road, in the rear of the latter, and they are abutting back to back. Exhibit R-10 is the report of a Civil Engineer relied on by the tenant and this also-shows that the access to the first floor in Door No. 7, Khanabagh Street, First Lane, which is also in the occupation of the tenant under the single lease, is only from Door No. 77, Triplicane High Road by a pucca staircase. This report Exhibit R-10 further discloses that there is no entrance from Door No. 77, Triplicane High Road, which is in the occupation of the tenant, to the ground floor of Door No. 7, Khanabagh Street, First Lane, and equally so, there is no entrance from the first floor of Door No. 7, Khanabagh Street, First Lane, to the ground floor in the same door number. These details amply demonstrate that Door No. 77, Triplicane High Road, and the first floor in Door No. 7, Khanabagh Street, First Lane, are practically forming a single unit though they bear different door numbers.

(3.) SENGOTTUVELAN, J., in Kandaswamy v: Hajee K.S. Mohd. Mohideen Rowther2, dealt with a case where the concerned premises were two separate portions of the building with another portion in between a consolidated rent for both the premises was fixed and there was no separate tenancy agreement in respect of each of the premises and both the landlord and the tenant had proceeded all along on the basis of a single tenancy, and the learned Judge, after adverting to the case law on the subject, held that a single petition for eviction in that case under section 10 (2) (ii) (b) and 10 (2) (iii) of the Act in respect of the entire premises can be maintained. Reference may also be made to the decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalakrishna Chetty v. Ganeshan3, where the Supreme Court repelled the contention that a single petition with regard to two different tenancies although in the same premises, one for residential purpose and the other for nonresidential purpose is not maintainable as without substance since the tenancy was one.