(1.) THE short but important question that arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the decision of a District Munsif in a suit in respect of land would operate as res judicata between the same parties in a reference under Section 31 of the land Acquisition Act, 1894, regarding the apportionment of the compensation for that land. The trial Court has answered this question in the affirmative, and the correctness of that decision is challenged before us in this appeal. The facts which lie on a narrow compass are briefly these. There are two claimants in this case. The controversy between them was with regard to the compensation in respect of an extent of 8,208 sq. ft. The first claimant contended that the second claimant was entitled only to an extent of 1 acre 16 cents and that the rest of the acquired area belonged to him, whereas the second claimant contended that out of the extent acquired he was entitled to 1 acre 40 cents. It was in those circumstances that the Acquisition Officer made the reference to the City Civil Court, Madras, for deciding the controversy. The Court upheld the claim of the second claimant. The first claimant and his father had instituted O. S. No. 360 of 1939 on the file of the district Munsif, Poonamallee, against the second claimant and another and prayed for possession of certain extent said to be in the possession of the second claimant. The second claimant contended that he was entitled to I acre 40 cents and that the plaintiffs had no claim whatsoever to that extent. The trial Court decreed the suit. Butin the appeal preferred by the second claimant, the decree of the trial Court was reversed holding that the second claimant was entitled to 1 acre 40 cents. This decision of the first appellate Court was confirmed by this court in S. A. No. 606 of 1943. As the plaintiff in the suit had obtained possession after the suit was decreed by the trial Court, the second claimant applied for restitution claiming that he was entitled to 1 acre 40 cents. The restitution was allowed. Against that order, the first claimant preferred an appeal but without success, with the result the second claimant's title to 1 acre 40 cents became conclusive as against the first claimant. What the first claimant, the appellant in this appeal, now contends is that the said decision, though it became final, cannot be put against him in this acquisition proceeding, as it cannot operate as res judicata. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the aforesaid decision was given by the District Munsif, whereas the question that has to be decided in this proceedings, is one that falls within the exclusive jurisdiction of the court under the Land Acquisition Act, which is the Court of original jurisdiction and which is a court of superior jurisdiction over the Court of the District Munsif and that, therefore, the principles of res judicata cannot be applied. It is also contended that Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure embodying the principles of res judicata is applicable only to suits, that the reference under the Land acquisition Act is not a suit and that, therefore, the decision above referred to cannot operate as res judicata.
(2.) THE scope of the principles of Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been the subject of consideration in a number of decisions, and it has been uniformly held that the section is not exhaustive. In Sheoparsan Singh v. Ramnandan, 43 ind App 91 = (AIR 1916 PC 78) the probate and Administration Act (Act V of 1881), rejecting the claim of certain persons who claimed to be the next reversioners and who contended that the will was a forgery. The very same persons filed a suit praying for a declaration that they were the next reversioners to the estate of the deceased and that the probate should be revoked. The decision in the probate proceedings was put forward as operating as res judicata by the defendants in that suit. This defense was sought to be met by the plea that the decision in the probate proceedings cannot operate as res judicata. Rejecting this contention Sir. Lawrence Jenkins, speaking for the Board, observed at page 98:
(3.) THE decisions in 43 Ind App 91 = (AIR 1916 PC 78); 48 Ind App 187 = (AIR 1921 PC 11) and 49 Ind App 129 = (AIR 1922 PC 80) were followed by the Judicial committee in a subsequent decision in Kalipada De v. Dwijapada Das, 57 Ind App 24 = (AIR 1930 PC 22 ). That was a case of a contentious proceedings under the probate and Administration Act, 1881. On the finding that a certain person was the nearest heir of the deceased, the question arose whether that decision was binding in a subsequent suit between the same parties. Following the earlier decisions, the board affirmed that the decision was binding under the general principles, though not under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure.