T S RAJAM AMMAL Vs. V N SWAMINATHAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) O. S. No. 51 of 1969 on the file of the court of the Subordinate Judge, nagapattinam, was instituted for a declaration that the sale deed dated 20-111969 executed by Subramania Pillai in favour of the fourth defendant represented by the third defendant, were not binding on the plaintiff and for recovery of the suit Items 1 to 13 from the 1st defendant and Item 14 from the fifth defendant and Items 15 to 19 from the second defendant. The plaint properties were valued by the plaintiff in the suit in the trial court on the market value as on the date of the plaint and not on the consideration mentioned in the sale deeds. It is against the decree passed in that suit, the second defendant in so far as Items 15 to 19 are concerned had purported to file an appeal, he sought to value the subject-matter of the appeal not on the basis of the market value of the items concerned, but on the basis of the consideration recited in the document cancelled by the trial court. The office pointed out that the appeal has to be valued on the basis of the market value of the items in question and not on the basis of the consideration recited in the document. The learned counsel for the proposed appellant relied on a decision of Maharajan, J. , in Andalammal v. Kanniah, and contended that the appeal has to be valued only with reference to the consideration recited in the sale deed and not with reference to the market value of the property involved. Since there is a decision of Sadasivam, J. , in Sengoda nadar v. Doraiswami, holding that the subject-matter has to be valued with reference to the market value of the properties involved, the matter has been placed before the Court.

(2.) I may immediately point out one thing viz. , there is the Full Bench decision of this court in Kutumba Sastri v. Balatripura Sundaramma. , 1939-1 Mad LJ 702 = (AIR 1939 Mad 462) (FB) dealing with the corresponding provision in the earlier act. According to that decision, the appeal has to be valued with reference to the market value of the properties involved and not with reference to the consideration recited in the document. Sadasivam, J. , in the judgment referred to above, has referred to and followed the Full Bench decision, while Maharajan, J. , has not referred to the Full Bench judgment at all it is in view of this feature alone the matter has come before me before I deal with the full bench judgement and the statutory language on which that decision was rested. I shall refer to a few observations of Maharajan, J. The learned Judge has stated that "i think it fruitless to refer to the conflicting authorities cited at the Bar in support of either view; firstly because the ratio decidendi in each of the authorities cited must be confined to the facts of that particular case, and secondly because most of the authorities were concerned with interpreting the corresponding section in the earlier Act, which in certain respects was worded differently from Section 40 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955. " After making the above observation the learned Judge extracted S. 40 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act 1955 and on his interpretation of that section he held that the court-fee is payable only on the consideration recited in the document and not on the market value of the property involved. I may draw attention to one or two features with reference to the observation of Maharajan, J. , extracted above. One is, not one decision of the court has been actually referred to by the learned Judge in his judgment, though the learned Judge stated that it was fruitless to refer to those authorities. Secondly, it is rather difficult to understand and how a ratio decidendi of a decision construing a section can be confined to the facts of the particular case alone. If the decision was expressly or impliedly rested only on the peculiar facts of the particular case the position may be different. But, when the decision seeks to construe a statutory provision and on the basis of that construction, a conclusion is arrived at as to the court-fee payable, it is difficult to appreciate how the ratio decidendi of that decision can be confined to the facts of that case. The next feature to be observed is that though the learned Judge has stated that the corresponding section in the earlier Act different in certain respects from Section 40 of the Madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955, he has not actually stated in what respects the corresponding section differed from Section 40 of the madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955.

(3.) HAVING made these observations, now I shall set out both the sections and deal with the Full Bench decision referred to already: s. 7 (iv-A) of the Court-fees Act, 1870, as amended by the Madras Court-fees (Amendment) Act, 1922 (Madras Act V of 1922 ). S. 40 of the madras Court-fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1955