LAWS(MAD)-1972-10-39

SRI PANCHANATHEESWARASWAMI DEVASTHANAM, REPRESENTED BY SOLE AND HEREDITARY TRUSTEE Vs. ABDUL MAJID AND ORS.

Decided On October 27, 1972
Sri Panchanatheeswaraswami Devasthanam, Represented By Sole And Hereditary Trustee Appellant
V/S
Abdul Majid And Ors. Respondents

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The Plaintiff in Original Suit No. 42 of 1964 on the file of the Court of the District Munsif of Tiruvaiyaru, who lost before the Courts below, is the Appellant herein. The Plaintiff -Devasthanam is admittedly the owner of the suit properties, namely (i) an extent of 2 acres and 32 cents in R.S. No. 321/1; (ii) an extent of 5 acres and 30 cents in R.S. No. 321/2; and (iii) an extent of 7 acres and 26 cents in R.S. No. 321/3 in Tiruvaiyaru, which have been described as items 1 to 3 in the plaint schedule properties. Of these three items, item 1 is described as nanja, while items 2 and 3 are described as punja. All these three items of properties were leased out by the Appellant to the Respondent herein under exhibit A -7, dated 18th February 1951 for a period of three years on the stipulation of a rent of 72 kalams of paddy with respect to nanja lands and a cash rent of Rs. 800 with respect to punja lands. Subsequently, it is admitted, that the said rent was reduced to 54 kalams of paddy and Rs. 600 cash. The Appellant herein instituted the present suit for recovery of possession of the suit properties and for arrears of rent with future profits. The defence put forward by the Respondent was that under Madras Act LVII of 1961, namely, the Madras Public Trusts (Regulation of Administration of Agricultural Lands) Act, 1961, hereinafter referred to as the Act., he was entitled to continue in possession and that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to evict him from the land in question. The Courts below have accepted this defence of the Respondent and dismissed the suit. The Plaintiff has come up to this Court with the present second appeal.

(2.) It is necessary to set out the respective contentions of the parties, before I deal with the question of law that arises in this case. As far as the Appellant is concerned in paragraph 4 of the plaint it was stated that R.S. No. 321/1 comprising 2 acres 32 cents were originally dry lands but later on cultivated as wet and for some years past, the said lands were again converted into plantain tope. As far as R.S. No. 321/2 and R.S. No. 321/3 are concerned, it was stated in the same paragraph that they were dry lands and had been converted into tope containing a large number of coconuts, mango and palmyrah trees. Exhibit A -7 lease deed itself refers to the existence of 252 yielding coconut trees and 541 coconut plants on items 2 and 3 of the suit lands. Based upon these allegations, the case of the Appellant was that the lands were topes and, therefore, they were outside the scope of the Act and consequently it was entitled to recover possession thoreof from the Respondent herein in a civil court. As against this the case of the Respondent was that the lands were not topes as defined in the Act consequently he was entitled to continue and Terrain in possession of the lands and that the civil Court had no jurisdiction to evict him. The question for consideration is, which of these two rival contentions is correct.

(3.) As far as the facts are concerned, there is not much of a controversy. Item 1 of the suit properties is admittedly nanja and has been described so. Therefore by no stretch of imagination item 1 of the suit properties can be characterized to be a tope as defined in that Act and, therefore, the Appellant, having regard to Sec. 18 of the Act, cannot seek to recover possession thereof from the Respondent herein in the civil Court. Mr. M. S. Venkatarama Ayyar, learned Counsel for the Appellant, conceded this position and therefore did not press the appeal with regard to item 1 of the suit properties. Consequently, the question has to be considered with regard to items 2 and 3 of the suit properties which have been described as dry lands in the lease deed itself and which, according to the Appellant, constitute topes as defined in the Act, and are therefore exempt from the operation of the Act.