(1.) THIS appeal which is directed against the judgment of Venkatadri, J. arises out of a suit instituted by the respondent for eviction of the appellant after removing the superstructure standing on the property and for arrears of rent. The appellant had, presumably with the permission of the respondent, put up a superstructure on the land which forms the subject -matter of dispute in this case. While the superstructure was in existence, the appellant obtained a lease from the respondent, the owner of the site, for a period of five years. Under the terms of the lease deed, the appellant agreed to surrender possession of the land after the period of the lease and during the interim period, not to sell or otherwise alienate the superstructure without the permission of the landlord. After the termination of the lease, the respondent instituted a suit for recovery of vacant possession of the land and for arrears of rent. The land is situate in the village of Jayankondam to which the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act have been extended by the Madras Government. The appellant contested the suit claiming that, as the property leased was a building within the meaning of the Act referred to above, he could not be evicted by a civil Court. The trial Court accepted that contention, and while passing a decree for eviction, and arrears of rent, prayed for by the respondent, it gave a declaration that the respondent could evict the appellant only in accordance with the provisions of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act. But an appeal against that decree by the respondent to the Subordinate Judge, Tiruchirappalli, proved successful. The learned Subordinate Judge held that the lease was of the land and not of the buildings, and therefore, the appellant would not be entitled to the protection under the Act. This view was affirmed in Second Appeal by Venkatadri, J., who, however, granted leave under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent for a further appeal.
(2.) THE only question in this appeal is as to what exactly was leased to the appellant by the respondent. There is no controversy that the site alone is the property of the respondent, and that at the time when lease was granted, there was a superstructure belonging to the appellant on the property. Whether, in such a case, i.e., where there is a lease of a site on which a building stands, the superstructure not being owned by the landlord, the lease is of a part of a building, or a vacant site has been the subject -matter of more than one decision in this Court. It is sufficient for the present purpose to refer to the decision in Irani v. Chidambara Chetti, (1952) M.L.J.221. In that case, there was a lease of a vacant land on which the tenant had put up a cinema theatre. That lease expired and the person who obtained an assignment of the tenancy earlier obtained a fresh lease from the owner of the site while the cinema theatre was standing thereon. In a suit for eviction instituted against the tenant, the benefits of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act were claimed by the lessee that is the owner of the superstructure, who had obtained a lease of the land. A Bench of this Court held that, there being a building on the land at the time when lease of the land was granted, the subject -matter of the lease could be regarded only as a part of the buildings, and that therefore the lease was of a building within the meaning of the Act. Satyanarayana Rao, J. delivering the judgment observed at page 227:
(3.) HAVING regard to the untenable pleas raised by the tenant, each party will bear his respective costs throughout.