K S R ACHARYA Vs. HALIMA MEERAN

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS is a civil revision petition under Section 115, C. P. C. against the decision of the Court of Small Causes at Madras, dismissing a new trial application, N. T. A. No. 77 of 1960, and confirming the judgment and decree in S. C. S. No. 3281 of 1959.

(2.) THE facts giving rise to this petition are as follows: The plaintiff in S. C. S. No. 3281 of 1959, Small Cause Court, Madras, sued to recover from the defendant the sum of Rs. 1205, alleged to have been paid by the plaintiff to the defendant on 15-12-1958, in pursuance of an agreement to purchase the defendant's house. The defendant was admittedly the owner of premises No. 14-B Station View Road, kodambakkam, and he agreed to sell that property to the plaintiff for a sum of Rs. 11600, and the agreement was embodied in a document dated 15-12-1958. The plaintiff alleged that she paid a sum of Rs. 1200 as advance under that agreement and that the advance amount was repayable to her, as the defendant did not sell the property as agreed to by him. The defendant admitted the receipt of the advance of Rs. 1200, but submitted that the advance was paid by the plaintiff's husband and not by the plaintiff, that he sold the house to the plaintiff's husband for Rs. 11500 and the advance of Rs. 1200 was adjusted towards the consideration of that sale. He denied liability to repay the amount to the plaintiff. There is no dispute that the defendant received the sum of Rs. 1200 under the terms of the agreement dated 15-12-1958 and the real dispute between the parties was Whether the sum so received was adjusted in the subsequent sale transaction between the defendant and the plaintiffs husband, or did it remain unadjusted. The case of the plaintiff was that her husband paid another sum of Rs. 1200 to the defendant to fulfil his obligation under the purchase made by him. Several documents were marked and oral evidence also was recorded at the trial. Though the issue arising in the case was apparently simple, the facts, as emerged at the trial, were conflicting and were of a complex character. The learned Small cause Judge, who tried this suit, reached the conclusion that P. W. 1, the plaintiff's husband, paid a separate advance on 29-1-1959 for the sale deed Ex. P-7 in his favour and that their original advance received by the defendant from the plaintiff was liable to be repaid, and accordingly granted a decree in favour of the plaintiff. The defendant preferred a new trial application under Section 38 of the Presidency small Cause Courts Act, and two learned Judges of the Court of Small Causes dismissed the application in these brief words : "heard. There is no question of law. Dismissed. " the defendant questions the correctness and propriety of the said decision in the new trial application, in this civil revision petition. The most striking feature of this impugned pronouncement is its extraordinary brevity, which arouses in the mind of the revising court the suspicion that the decision is ill-considered and arbitrary. Bereft of narration of the pleadings in the case, discussion of the evidence adduced, and the reasons for the conclusion, the decision, I hesitate to call it a judgment, has all the look of an ipse dixit without the quality of judicial persuasiveness. It does not satisfy the party who has lost the case, and, of course, cannot carry conviction even to the most fastidious revising court rigidly applying section 115, C. P. Code. However hard pressed for time the learned Judges of the court of Small Causes may be, and however plain and uncomplicated the facts of the case may appear to them, it is not a proper discharge of duty to dispose of a new trial application by merely dismissing it. A judgment, withholding the reasons on which it is based, and silent regarding the contentions raised before the court, is disappointing, unsatisfactory and improper. 2a. The procedure in the Court of Small Causes, Madras, is not governed by all the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. Section 8 of the C. P. Code reads :

(3.) LEARNED counsel for the respondent submits that the new trial Court can order retrial under Section 38 of the Presidency Small Cause Courts Act only if there is any error of law in the judgment at the original trial and that If no question of law is raised or can arise, the court can hardly do anything better than to say that no question of law is involved in the case. But this argument overlooks that it is the fundamental duty of a court to state briefly the contentions raised before it and to pronounce its opinion on them. A laconic order is very often a mere cloak for unreasonableness. Justice should not merely be done but appear to be done, and an aggrieved suitor before a court of law reasonably expects to know why his contentions failed. It is true that this court has taken the view that the new trial court is not an appellate Court that can decide questions of fact. Section 38 of the presidency Small Cause Courts Act is as follows :