RATHINASAMY KONAR Vs. NAGAMMAL

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS second appeal by the defendant in a suit for possession, involves the application of Section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (Central Act XXX of 1956) to the admitted and established facts. The matter has a certain degree of interest. It appears to me that the result of the application would have to be somewhat different from that arrived at by both the Courts below, and that the appellant would hence be entitled to succeed to a partial extent.

(2.) THE original owner of the suit properties was one Singara Konar who died in 1931. He left two widows behind him, namely, the first plaintiff (whose daughter is the second plaintiff), and one Poornathachi. The widows were unable to live together amicably, and, in consequence of a certain mediation, Poornathachi purported to execute a release deed in favour of the first plaintiff and her daughter (second plaintiff), under the original of Ex. a. i dated 29-4-1931. The effective part of this instrument has been set forth by the first appellate Court, in the original tamil text, in paragraph 8 of its judgment. Actually, nothing very much turns upon the interpretation of the relevant clause. What Poornathachi said, with reference to the suit property, was that she would possess and enjoy the property for her lifetime, paying government kist, and that after her, the first plaintiff and her daughter (the second plaintiff) were to take the properties.

(3.) THE first Court thought that Pooranathachi actually acquired the property under this document and hence concluded that her interest was not enlarged into an absolute interest by virtue of Section 14 of the Central Act No. XXX of 1956. It is not in dispute that, under Sub-section (2) of Section 14 of the Act, Sub-section (1)is not applicable to "property acquired by way of gift or under a will or any other instrument or under a decree". But the first appellate Court rightly pointed out that it could not be stated as a proper inference, from the admitted facts, that poornathachi acquired any interest in the suit property by virtue of this release deed. On the contrary, the facts were that the two widows were each entitled to an equal interest in the estate of the late Singara Konar, and that the document of release did not clothe the executant of that document (Poornathachi) with any new right. Further, as the learned counsel for the appellant rightly contends, Ex. a. i is a release by Poornathachi in favour of the first plaintiff and her daughter. It is not a document to which the first plaintiff was a party, and it is not a simultaneous release by each of the two widows of any right or interest in favour of the other, being a unilateral document executed by Poornathachi alone, who does not purport to acquire any right or interest under that document it is difficult to say how the document could be said to fall within the scope of Section 14 (2) of the Act.