R NAGALINGAM Vs. UNIVERSITY OF MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE petitioner appeared in September 1961 for the Second B. E. (Integrated course) under the first respondent University. On 9-11-1961, the Registrar of the university sent a notice to the petitioner stating that the Chief Superintendent, university Examinations, Thyagaraja College of Engineering, Madurai, reported that he had reasons to suspect that pages 12 to 15 and 28 to 32 of the answerbook were brought from outside and inserted by him in the examination and jn support of it the Chief Superintendent relied that (1) There were folds at the middle of these pages, (2) the handwriting of the petitioner showed extreme calmness and (3) some of the matter he had written in those pages were irrelevant to the questions asked in the examination. In the circumstances, the registrar, by a notice, called upon the petitioner to submit by return of post his explanation as to why disciplinary action should not be taken against him for having violated Rule 7 of the pamphlet "instructions to the Candidates" issued to him along with the hall ticket. The petitioner received the notice on 13-11-1961 and sent his explanation on 17-11-1961. On 30-12-1961 the Syndicate Committee on discipline read (1) the letter dated 17-9-1961 from the Chief Superintendent,. University Examinations, Thyagaraja College of Engineering, Madurai, enclosing and forwarding the answer paper of the candidate with the Register No. 358 in physics II and (2) the petitioner's explanation and "resolved that the examination taken by the candidate be cancelled, that he be debarred from appearing for the next two examinations held by the University and that the candidate be not permitted to undergo any course of studies in this University during this period. " the records sent up to this Court relating to this matter show an endorsement dated 30-12-1961, made by the Convener of the syndicate Committee on discipline :

(2.) THE main ground urged for the petitioner is that neither the proceedings resulting in nor the resolution of the Syndicate nor the order of the University communicated to him disclosed what the Syndicate's finding was on the charge levelled against him. It is common ground that the final authority in matters of discipline is vested in the Syndicate and that no particular procedure to be followed in dealing with cases of discipline has been prescribed either by the statutory provisions or regulations made thereunder. Even so, the contention is that the Syndicate, when it exercises its jurisdiction in disciplinary matters, functions in a quasi-judicial capacity and, it is therefore, bound not only to arrive at a conclusion or finding on the fasts and proof of the charge but also give reasons therefor. I consider that the contention is well-founded.

(3.) THAT in exercise of its disciplinary jurisdiction the Syndicate functions in a quasi-judicial capacity can admit of no doubt. It is true that on this aspect neither the statutory provisions nor the rules or regulations framed thereunder throw light. But it is obvious that, particularly in circumstances as are present in this case, the result of a disciplinary proceeding is fraught with serious consequence to the candidate concerned, and in some cases the result may be such as may practically destroy his career. In such cases, a disciplinary action decided upon presupposes and involves as I think, and necessarily by the basic principles of law and justice, an accusation, the answer thereto, examination of both, and a conclusion arrived at by the duly constituted authority both on the question of guilt and quantum of punishment. In that sense the jurisdiction of the Syndicate to inflict punishment on candidates for misconduct is quasi-judicial in character. This proposition, as is clear, if I may say with respect, from the judgment of the Supreme Court in Board of High School and Intermediate Education U. P. Allahabad v. Ghanshyam Das, is well settled. That was a case where no opportunity whatever was given to the candidates affected to give en explanation and present his case before the Committee of enquiry. On that ground the order of punishment was set aside. The Supreme Court observed,