IN RE: S.A.A. BEYABANI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) CRI . M. P. No. 447 of 1952: This is an application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment in Cri. Ap. No. 682 of 1950. That was an appeal preferred by the state against the acquittal of the accused by the Stationary Sub -Magistrate of Nellore in respect of a charge for an offence under Section 44, Madras District Police Act. One of the grounds on which leave is sought is that this prosecution is barred under Section 63 , Madras District Police Act. I must state at once that this point was neither raised before the trial Court nor was that raised before me when the appeal was heard. I think at the time when the appeal was heard, the advocate must have bestowed some attention on this point and very probably he rightly felt that there was no force in this contention, and that is why he did not raise it before me. However, as the point has been raised in this application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, I must deal with it.

(2.) SECTION 53 says that all actions and prosecutions against any person, which may be lawfully brought for 'anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act' or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police shall be commenced within three months after the act complained of. "Anything done or intended to be done under the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the police" have been introduced by an amendment by Act 8 of 1947. Before that this section was as follows: "Anything done or intended to be done either under the provisions of this Act or under the provisions of any other law for the time being in force conferring powers on the Police". Even before that, according to the decision in - - 'Murugesa Naidu, In re',, AIR 1916 Mad 142 (A), the words were "for anything done under the provisions of this Act under the General Police powers". This section has been the subject of interpretation in 'Chendrial, in re', The Law of Offences and Criminal Procedure - -, 1 Weir 846 (B)'. There a Bench of the Court consisting of Muttuswamy Aiyar and Best JJ. have held that this section has reference only to acts done or intended to be done under colour of the Act whereas the act complained of was not professedly done in the exercise of any power conferred by the Act in that case, the act that was complained of was one of having bought and sold goats, an offence falling under Section 44 as it then stood.

(3.) THE third contention is that there was no sanction given by the District Superintendent of Police to prosecute this person. So far as the Act is concerned, there is no provision of law under which sanction is necessary. He relies upon a G. O. according to which it is stated that it is the District Superintendent of Police that must sanction the prosecution against the Police officer. It is not a provision in the Act. In the absence of any provision providing for sanction in the Act itself, I do not think that any sanction is necessary under the Act for prosecuting the accused. So long as the provisions of this Act do not require that sanction by the District Superintendent of Police is necessary, the prosecution does not become invalid without such sanction. That contention also fails.