N.GOPALAN Vs. STATE OF MADRAS

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IN this Appeal under the Letters Patent against the decision of Subba Rao J. dismissing the appellant's application for a writ of certiorari, the only ground taken is the invalidity of Madras Estates Land (Reduction of Rent) Second Amendment Act, 1951. That Act inserted a sub -section in Section 3 of the original Act and substituted a clause for a clause already existing in Section 4 of the principal Act and by Section 4 made provision for adjustment of rent paid by a ryot before the commencement of the amending Act. The excess was to be adjusted towards the rent payable by the ryot to the landholder for subsequent faslis. The ryot was in certain circumstances entitled to claim a refund of the amount remaining unadjusted from the landholder to whom it was paid.

(2.) MR . R. Kesaya Aiyangar contended that the Act is unconstitutional for two reasons: (1) because it was retrospective and to that extent was inconsistent with the provisions of Article 372(1) of the Constitution and (2) because it was confiscatory in so far as it directed the adjustment of rent already paid before the commencement of the Constitution.

(3.) IT was next contended that the provision in the Amending Act for adjustment of rents already paid is confiscatory in nature and therefore unconstitutional. Reliance was placed on the observations in the recent decision of the Supreme Court in - - 'The State of Bihar v. Kameswar Singh', : [1952]1SCR889 , made in connection with the provision of the Bihar Act under which 50 per cent. of the arrears of rent collected by the Government was appropriated by the Government without payment of any compensation to the landholder. We fail to see how these observations can be of any help to the appellants here. There is no acquisition by the Government of any portion of the rent. The impugned provision is only a provision adjusting the account between landholder and tenant. Such a provision would be a provision pertaining to the relationship of landlord and tenant but would in no sense be a provision for acquisition of any interest in land by the Government. There is therefore no question of confiscation. It is true that the result of the enactment may be to prejudicially affect the rights of the appellants, but that itself would not make the provision illegal or unconstitutional.