N.RAMAKRISHNAN Vs. DEPUTY INSPECTOR GENERAL OF POLICE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) Challenge in this writ petition is against a charge memo, dated 15.3.2008. The case of the petitioner is that he was appointed as 'Sub-Inspector of Police' on 28.9.1987 and thereafter, promoted as 'Inspector of Police' on 28.9.2000. While the petitioner was working as Inspector of Police at Kulasekarapattinam Police Station, a criminal case was foisted against him in Cr. No. 261 of 2004, on the file of Kulasekarapattinam Police Station, for the offences said to have been committed under Sections 376(2A), 313 and 506(ii), IPC r/w Section 4 of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act, 2002. The said case in Cr. No. 261 of 2004 was taken cognizance of in S.C. No. 224 of 2005, by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge (Fast Track Court No. II), Tuticorin. After a full-fledged trial, the learned Judge acquitted the petitioner by holding that there was no evidence available for convicting the petitioner for the offences said to have been committed by him. The acquittal is an honourable acquittal and not by way of giving benefit of doubt. The said Judgment was passed by the Sessions Court on 18.1.2006. Thereafter, the respondent issued the impugned charge memo on 15.3.2008.

(2.) The respondent filed a counter-affidavit and stated that the petitioner developed illicit intimacy with one Seethalakshmi and made her pregnant by falsely assuring her to marry. Based on the complaint given by said Seethalakshmi, a case in crime No. 261 of 2004 under Sections 379, 313, 506(ii), IPC and 4(1) of Tamil Nadu Prohibition of Harassment of Women Act was registered against him. The petitioner was also absent from duty between 2.7.2004 and 25.10.2004 without any leave or permission from the competent authority, in order to evade arrest in connection with the said criminal case. The petitioner, thus, committed 'desertion' for having absented from duty for 21 days, without permission. Therefore, disciplinary proceedings were initiated against the petitioner by issuing a charge memo. Though he was acquitted by the learned Additional District and Sessions Judge on 18.1.2006, the department is entitled to issue the charge memo, if there is preponderance of probability in disciplinary proceedings, wherein high standard of proof is not necessary as required under the criminal proceedings. There is no time limit fixed for initiation of the departmental proceedings and therefore, the petitioner cannot raise the plea of limitation or delay.

(3.) Mr. M. Ajmalkhan, learned Senior counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that when the petitioner was honourably acquitted by the criminal Court, there is no basis for issuing the first charge, when the subject-matter of criminal case as well as the first charge in the charge memo are one and the same and arising out of same set of facts and circumstances. Insofar as the second charge is concerned, the learned Senior counsel submitted that when admittedly, the petitioner was placed under suspension from 2.7.2004 to 21.3.2006, the question of absent without permission does not arise at all between the period 2.7.2004 and 25.10.2004 and therefore, there is no basis for issuing the second charge also. Thus, the very attitude of the respondent in issuing the second charge shows malice. He also submitted that there is an inordinate delay of four years in issuing the charge memo which is not reasonably explained by the respondent. When there is no bar for proceeding against the petitioner simultaneously, the respondent has to explain the undue delay of four years in initiating the departmental proceedings. The absence of such explanation vitiates the entire proceedings.