(1.) The present Second Appeal has been filed by the appellant/defendant, questioning the correctness of the Judgment and decree, dated 08.09.2006, passed by the Sub Court, Kallakurichi, in A. S. No. 52 of 2004, whereby, the judgment and decree passed in favour of the plaintiff by the II Additional District Munsif Court, Kallakurichi, in O. S. No. 230 of 1999 on 15.12.2003, was confirmed.
(2.) Brief facts, which led to filing of the Second Appeal, are given as under:-
(3.) The trial court, after referring to the registered sale agreement under Ex. A1, dated 23.09.1998, and the legal notice under Ex. A2, dated 06.04.1999, whereby, the defendant was called upon by the plaintiff to perform his part of the contract after receiving the balance consideration of Rs. 3,350/-, and by relying upon a judgment of this Court (Sherwood Educational Society vs Abid Namazie And Two Others, 1997 1 MadLJ 445) to the effect that admission of opposite party is the best piece of evidence, found that the defendant himself admitted the execution of the registered sale agreement on 23.09.1998, though with the allegation of execution under force and threat, and that there is no evidence whatsoever either oral or documentary produced by the defendant to substantiate that the sale agreement dated 23.09.1998 was executed by exercising threat and coercion. By observing that when the defendant had set up a plea of coercion for execution of the sale agreement, the burden of proof lies only on him to prove successfully the application of coercion by the plaintiff against the defendant and that further, except DWs. 1 and 2 no independent witness whispering about coercion and threat employed by the plaintiff during execution of sale agreement was examined by the defendant, the trial court negatived the allegation of threat and coercion with a specific observation that DWs. 1 and 2, who are brothers, not even had chosen to file any police complaint against the plaintiff about the alleged threat or coercion said to have been exerted by him for execution of the sale agreement, and held that the suit for specific performance filed by the plaintiff/respondent herein fulfilled all the ingredients of Section 16 (c) of the Specific Relief Act, 1963 which mandates readiness and willingness on the part of the plaintiff and it is a condition precedent for obtaining the relief of grant of specific performance, and ultimately decreed the suit for specific performance by applying the aforesaid provision of the Specific Relief Act.