DANIEL THIRUMENI Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE above criminal revision has been filed by the petitioner/accused against the order passed by the Special Judge for CBI Cases, chennai in an application filed by the petitioner under Section 91 of Cr. P. C. to summon the documents.

(2.) THE petitioner has categorically stated in his petition before the trial Court to summon the below mentioned documents: (a) Entire file S4/108/99 Bonds available with Additional Commissioner (Bonds) Customs Department, Air Cargo Complex, meenambakkam, Chennai-600 027 with Bill of Entry No. 17658 dated 19. 08. 1999, original and duplicate both on the covering letter u/sec. 139 of Cr. P. C. (b) THE clearance particulars of voice over I. P. , P. C. Cord Bond No. 8768 dated 25. 08. 1999 Bill of Entry No. 17658 dated 19. 08. 1999 awb/bill of lading No. and date: MAWB : 618-594 25553 MAWB : 36093326/11. 08. 1999 THEse particulars are available with the Deputy Manager, international Airport Authority of India, Air Cargo Complex (Imports), meenam-bakkam, Chennai - 600 027.

(3.) LEARNED Special Public Prosecutor Mr. Ranganathan appearing for the respondent/cbi submitted that under Section 91 of Cr. P. C. whenever the Court considers it necessary or desirable for the purpose of trial may issue summons for production of the documents. Thus, in order to make the provisions of Section 91 of Cr. P. C. , applicable, the documents must be considered to be necessary or desirable which must be judicially determined by the Court. According to the learned standing counsel for respondent, the Court below has found that the documents are unnecessary, hence the petition was rightly dismissed. The learned Special Public Prosecutor appearing for the c. B. I. relied upon the decision in Om Parkash Sharma v. CBI, Delhi, 2000 SCC (Crl.) 1014, wherein the Honourable Supreme Court has held in para 6 that : The powers conferred under Section 91 are enabling in nature aimed at arming the court or any officer in charge of a police station concerned to enforce and to ensure the production of any document or other things necessary or desirable for the purposes of any investigation, inquiry, trial or other proceeding under the Code, by issuing a summons or a written order to those in possession of such material. The language of Section 91 would, no doubt, indicate the width of the powers to be unlimited but the inbuilt limitation inherent therein takes its colour and shape from the stage or point of time of its exercise, commensurately with the nature of proceedings as also the compulsions of necessity and desirability, to fulfil the task or achieve the object. The question, at the present stage of the proceedings before the trial Court would be to address itself to find whether there is sufficient ground for proceeding to the next stage against the accused. If the accused could produce any reliable material even at that stage which might totally affect even the very sustainability of the case, a refusal to even look into the materials so produced may result in injustice, apart from averting an exercise in futility at the expense of valuable judicial/public time. It is trite law that the standard of proof normally adhered to at the final stage is not to be insisted upon at the stage where the consideration is to be confined to find out a prima facie case and decide whether it is necessary to proceed to the next stage of framing the charges and making the accused to stand trial for the same. This Court has already cautioned against undertaking a roving inquiry into the pros and cons of the case by weighing the evidence or collecting materials, as if during the course or after trial vide union of India v. Prafulla Kumar Samal. Ultimately, this would always depend upon the facts of each case and it would be difficult to lay down a rule of universal application and for all times. The fact that in one case the Court thought fit to exercise such powers is no compelling circumstance to do so in all and every case before it, as a matter of course and for the mere asking. The Court concerned must be allowed a large latitude in the matter of exercise of discretion and unless in a given case the Court was found to have conducted its elf in so demonstrably an unreasonable manner unbecoming of a judicial authority, the Court superior to that Court cannot intervene very lightly or in a routine fashion to interpose or impose itself even at that stage. The reason being, at that stage, the question is one of mere proprieties involved in the exercise of judicial discretion by the Court and not of any rights concretised in favour of the accused. In the above case, the Honourable Supreme Court held that the accused filed an application for summoning and production of documents to show that he was not guilty. The said application was made during the proceedings of discharge of the accused. The Trial Court dismissed the application holding that the documents were not of such a nature which would show that the prosecution case was improper or unworthy and the accused was merely attempting to delay the proceedings. The High Court concurred with the finding of the trial Court. The Honourable Supreme Court confirmed the order of the Courts below dismissing the application of the accused filed during the proceedings for discharge of the accused and held that the standard of proof required at the final stage is not required before taking a decision to frame the charge or to discharge the accused. Ultimately, the Honourable Supreme Court declined to interfere with the order passed by the Trial Court as well as the High Court. But, so far as the present case is concerned, the petition to summon the documents was filed at the stage of Trial. Hence, the decision cited supra will not be applicable to the instant case.