RAVINDRAN T Vs. PRESIDING OFFICER LABOUR COURT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THIS writ petition is filed against the award passed by the Labour Court in I. D. No. 213 of 1990. The petitioner before this Court was the workman in the second respondent-Society, namely, Pollachi Co-operative House construction Society. The workman joined the service on October 25, 1976. On May 19, 1989 he submitted his resignation. It was handed over to the Secretary in person. Subsequently on May 29, 1989 he sent a letter withdrawing the resignation letter. After this withdrawal letter was given, a communication was received from the second respondent, dated October 11, 1989, which was received on October 13, 1989, by the petitioner herein stating that his resignation letter was accepted already. Therefore, the petitioner herein raised an industrial dispute before the Labour Court. Before the Labour Court he submitted that on October 11, 1989, he submitted another application requesting the management to permit him to join duty. On the same day the management wrote a letter informing him that his resignation has been accepted and he has been relieved with effect from May 19, 1989 itself. Then he stated that the management has failed to understand the involuntary nature of resignation. It was made under coercion and due to compulsion. Further he has stated that he sent a lawyer's notice on March 5, 1990. He also stated that at the time of joining duty the management took resignation letter from him without date and now the facts are twisted. After recording the evidence of workman and the management witness the Labour Court dismissed the industrial dispute holding that the petitioner even earlier twice, gave resignation letters and they were withdrawn subsequently and the management gave him employment on humanitarian grounds. The workman cannot expect the management to act in the same manner for the third time. It was also held that the resignation letter was accepted on the very same day in his presence and he was immediately relieved from duties. Therefore, the Labour Court has come to the conclusion that the petitioner is not entitled for employment. Aggrieved against this order the present writ petition has been filed.

(2.) LEARNED counsel for the petitioner argued that this is a contract of employment and according to the contract of employment, resignation brings the employment to an end and therefore, such a termination of employment can be done only in accordance with the rules and as per the rules applicable to him, 15 days' notice is necessary for either party to bring the contract to an end. Therefore, the letter of resignation will come into effect only on the completion of 15 days. Therefore, the counsel submitted that when the letter of resignation was given on May 19, 1989, it can come into effect after the completion of 14 days and that even before the completion of 14 days on May 29, 1989 itself the petitioner sent a letter withdrawing his letter of resignation. Therefore, there cannot be a termination of service before the expiry of 14 days. Therefore, the petitioner is deemed not to have resigned and he is deemed to be continuing in service. Therefore, the order of the Labour Court is illegal and it is liable to be set aside. In support of his argument the learned counsel relied upon the decision of the Andhra Pradesh Court in K. Sudha Nagaraj v. Chief Manager, Andhra Bank, 1997-III-LLJ (Suppl)-301 and General Manager, BHEL Ltd. v. Rajita Suryakanta, 1999-11-LLJ-549, where the Andhra Pradesh High Court has held that when the resignation letter was tendered in writing, it has to be accepted only in writing and the acceptance of resignation cannot be communicated orally. In the present case there was no letter of acceptance of resignation and therefore, the learned counsel submitted that the resignation of the workman has not become effective and he is deemed to be continuing in the service. He further relied upon the decision of the supreme Court in Punjab National Bank v. P. K. Mittal, AIR 1989 SC 1083 : 1989 Supp. (2) SCC 175 : 1989-I-LLJ-368, wherein the Supreme court held that acceptance of resignation before the expiry of the notice period will not be effective and the resignation alleged to have been accepted immediately is not valid. The judgment of the Supreme Court is based on the facts of the particular case. In that case the resignation letter itself contained a condition. In that letter of resignation the employee had added that the date of receipt of letter should be treated as the date of commencement of notice period so that inclusive of the same his resignation will be effective from June 30,. 1986. In that case since the resignation was accepted on February 7, 1986, the Supreme Court held that it was without jurisdiction. Therefore, it is the case where acceptance was against the terms contained in the very letter of resignation. In the same case, in that case since the resignation was accepted on February 7, 1986, the Supreme Court in Para 6, holds that the employee may choose to resign with immediate effect or with a notice of less than three months if the bank agrees to the same. Therefore, the preposition that was laid down in that case by the Supreme Court is that when the letter of resignation fixes the date from which it has to come into force, any acceptance prior to that date is not valid. At the same time the notice period can be waived by either of the parties if both of them agree for the same. Therefore, this decision of the Supreme Court is not of any help to the petitioner.