(1.) THESE are references on the basis of the directions of this court under Section 256(2) of the Income -tax Act, 1961 (herein referred to as 'the Act'), and the question of law referred to us reads as under : 'Whether, on the facts and in the circumstances of the case, the Appellate Tribunal is right in law in holding that the assessee is entitled to deduction under Section 32A on the plant and machinery used in construction work ?'
(2.) THOUGH there are three tax case references, the assessment year involved is common, viz., 1982 -83. The Assessing Officer completed the original assessment of the assessee for the assessment year 1982 -83 and allowed the investment allowance claimed by the assessee under Section 32A of the Income -tax Act, 1961, on the plant and machinery employed in construction work. The Commissioner of Income -tax, Tamil Nadu, Chennai -34, exercised the revision power under Section 263 of the Act and held that the assessee was engaged in the construction activities and hence he was not entitled to the investment allowance. Accordingly, he directed the Assessing Officer to withdraw the investment allowance allowed wrongly for the assessment year 1982 -83. The Income -tax Officer in turn passed a fresh assessment order in pursuance of the direction of the Commissioner of Income -tax holding that the assessee was a building contractor and it cannot be said to be manufacturing or processing any article and, therefore, the assessee was not entitled to the investment allowance. Accordingly, he withdrew the investment allowance earlier granted in the original assessment and disallowed the investment allowance claimed. The assessee preferred an appeal against the revised order of assessment before the Commissioner of Income -tax (Appeals), Chennai. The Commissioner of Income -tax (Appeals) allowed the appeal preferred by the assessee on the ground that the business of the contractor would constitute an industrial undertaking and, therefore, the assessee was entitled to the benefit of investment allowance. The Commissioner of Income -tax (Appeals) relied upon the decision of the Orissa High Court in CIT v. N. C. Budharaja and Co. : [1980]121ITR212(Orissa) , in taking the view that the assessee was entitled to the investment allowance under Section 32A of the Act. The Revenue aggrieved by the order of the Commissioner of Income -tax (Appeals) preferred a separate appeal before the Income -tax Appellate Tribunal. The Commissioner of Income -tax (Appeals), while deciding the point of investment allowance in favour of the assessee, dismissed the appeal preferred by the assessee on other points. The assessee preferred independent appeals against the order of the Commissioner of Income -tax (Appeals) and that is why there were three appeals before the Income -tax Appellate Tribunal and, consequently, there are three tax cases.
(3.) WE heard Mr. Naresh Kumar, learned counsel appearing for the Revenue, and Mr. V. Ramachandran, learned senior counsel appearing for the assessee. We find from the orders of the Appellate Tribunal that the Tribunal has decided the question only on the basis of the decision of the Kerala High Court in the case of Bhageeratha Engineering Ltd. : [1992]193ITR674(Ker) . We are of the view that the Tribunal should consider the materials available on record and decide the question whether the assessee was entitled to the investment allowance particularly in view of the decision of the Supreme Court in CIT v. N. C. Budharaja and Co. : [1993]204ITR412(SC) . The Tribunal in the instant case has not gone into the factual matter as there is nothing in the order of the Tribunal to show the basis on which the Tribunal came to the conclusion that the assessee was entitled to investment allowance. In an unreported decision of the Supreme Court in Asia Foundations and Constructions Limited v. CIT dated November 17, 1994, the Supreme Court after taking note of the decision of its own decision in the case of N. C. Budharaja and Co. : [1993]204ITR412(SC) has held as under : 'We find that even the Tribunal's order does not indicate fully and appropriately the facts and circumstances of the case on which the aforesaid question of law arising for decision in the present case was decided by it. As earlier stated there is no reference to the facts of the case in the High Court's order. There is thus nothing even in the order of the Tribunal much less in that of the High Court to indicate the facts and circumstances in which the aforesaid decision of this court was applied for answering the aforesaid question of law. In such a situation examination of the same on the merits by us in the first instance, without the benefit of an accepted summary on the facts of the case being available on record would not be appropriate. It does appear to us that the position in the High Court was also similar and, therefore, the more appropriate course to adopt is to send back the matter to the Tribunal for a fresh decision of the appeal on the merits after hearing both sides, in accordance with law in the light of the decisions of this court on this point. We order accordingly.'