(1.) THE present revision has been filed challenging the order of the Court below dated 17/11/1997 in I.A.No. 3496 of 1996 in O.S.No. 767 of 1996 in and by which the Court below refused to allow the petitioner's application for condoning the delay in filing the application for setting aside the preliminary decree dated 12/3/1990. Admittedly, the present I.A. in I.A.No. 3496 of 1996 came to be filed only on 3/6/1996. THE petitioner wanted to contend that the limitation would start only from the date of knowledge of the preliminary decree, in as much as, he came to know of passing of the preliminary decree dated 12/3/1990 only when he received the notice in the final decree proceedings. THE petitioner obviously omitted to take note of very relevant factor that at the time when the preliminary decree was passed on 12/3/1990, the first defendant as whose legal representative, the petitioner now wants to pursue the proceedings was very much alive and he did not bother to seek for setting aside the ex parte order passed against him.
(2.) IN such circumstances, the petitioner cannot be allowed to contend that the limitation would start only from the date of knowledge acquired by him in regard to the passing of the preliminary decree dated 12/3/1990. IN the light of the fact that the first defendant was very much alive on the date when the preliminary decree came to be passed in his absence, it is axiomatic that the crucial date for counting the period of limitation for setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree started running as from the date on which the first defendant was set ex parte in which event, the delay was more than six years and since the petitioner did not come forward to seek for condonation of such abnormal delay in the present application in I.A.No. 3496 of 1996, I do not find any illegality or irregularity in the order of the Court below in rejecting the petitioner's application for setting aside the ex parte preliminary decree dated 12/3/1990. The revision petition therefore, fails and the same is dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P.No. 1900 of 1998 is also dismissed.