ABDUL KALAM Vs. GOVERNMENT OF TAMIL NADU

JUDGEMENT

(1.) DR. A. S. Anand, C. J. : The validity of Rule 4-Aof the Tamil Nadu Document writers Rules (hereinafter referred to as the Rules), introduced by amendment vide G. O. Ms. No. 317, C. T. & R. E. Department, dated 23. 5. 1990, which reads as under was called in question through a number of writ petitions: ' ; 4-A present licence holders to continue till 60 years of age: The persons holding document Writer' ; s licences as on 23rd May, 1990 shall continue as such till they complete sixty of age.' ; The dismissal of the writ petitions has led to the filing of these appeals. Since they the determination of common and identical issues and have been heard and considered common, they are being disposed of by this common judgment.

(2.) ACCORDING to the appellants, who have given their ages in the writ petitions filed by they were orally intimated by the concerned registering authorities that they could not on their profession as document writers, having regard to the impugned rule since they attained the age of 60 years. The learned single judges who heard the writ petitions were the view that the provision of Sec. 89-B of the Registration Act confers ample powers authorities to enact a rule of the type impugned in the writ petitions and that rule (supra) was based upon sound reason and principle. It was also opined that the Government was right in its view that exercise of care and diligence could be possible only reasonable period of life of an individual and that it was in the interest of the public general to restrict the profession of document writers till a particular age was reached. appellants have seriously questioned the views expressed by the learned single Judges different writ petitions.

(3.) RULE 4-A (supra) provides that the persons holding document Writer' ; s licence 23. 5. 1990' ; shall continue as such till they complete sixty years of age.' ; A perusal of RULEs, as amended from time to time, on the date of the passing of the impugned Government Order dated 23. 5. 1990 shows that they contained no prohibition for a licence be renewed in cases of licensees beyond the age of 60 years. There is no rule which provides that the licence granted would automatically expire or lapse on the licensee completing age of 60 years. Considering the stand taken by the respondents in the counter affidavit the impugned rule was inserted to prevent the document writers from carrying on profession beyond the age of 60 years, we find that rule 4-A on its plain reading, miserably fails to achieve that objective. The phraseology adopted in the rule is more in the nature an enabling provision allowing the document writers holding licence as on 23. 5. 1990 continue till they complete 60 years of age and does not go any further or restriction or disqualify anyone. RULE 4-A as such cannot be so construed as to positively disqualifying anyone from holding a licence after the age of 60 years or anyone to either apply for a licence after he has completed the age of 60 years renewal of the licence after attaining the age of 60 years. Keeping in view that the counter affidavit and reiterated at the Bar, we must record the vagueness of writ large and RULE 4-A lacks clarity and definiteness. The rule is capable of being as it stands and can lead to arbitrary actions which may even border on absurdities. registering authorities appear to have construed RULE 4-A to be disqualifying factor as per the appellants, they were orally told by the registering authorities that they to stop the profession of document writing after having attained the age of 60 years. Such a construction flow from a plain reading of the rule itself. RULE 4-A, being vague and indefinite, workable. 8. That apart, the licence granted to document writers does not create any relationship master and servant under the State. The licensing RULEs merely regulate the profession writing documents. RULE 5 of the RULEs prescribes a qualification for the grant of a licence a person. The right to practice as a document writer is saved by RULE 4 (1) (iv) by granting licences under RULE 9 of the RULEs and the subsequent renewals are regulated by RULE the rules. The statutory form of licence itself imposes several stringent conditions. 9. RULE 16 provides for the suspension and cancellation of a licence and it would advantageous to refer to RULE 16 (3) of the RULEs which provides effective steps and confers necessary powers to enforce the requirements of the, rules and the conditions of a licence. That rule reads thus: ' ; 16 (3 ). The Licensing Authority shall have the powers to revoke or cancel the licence document writer for misconduct or unsatisfactory work or for any disqualification prescribed in RULE 5, or for breach of any of the conditions of the licence, after giving opportunity to show cause against the action proposed to be taken against him' ;. A bare reading of RULE 16 (3) goes to show that the licensing authority has enough powers revoke or cancel a licence of document writer not only for misconduct, but' ; unsatisfactory work' ; or for breach of any of the conditions of the licence. This therefore provides enough safeguard for the purpose which, according to the respondents, impelled the government to issue the Government Order incorporating the impugned A to the rules. Indeed, the prescription of an upper age limit has always been considered be necessary to weed out inefficiency of those who have lost their keenness and due to advanced age and physical deterioration of their health or failure of the faculties with a view to ensure efficient replacement of such persons by younger elements which aims at providing for better employment opportunities to educated youth, but normally, provision of an upper age limit as a method of superannuation is designed in government service, public service and other services and such prescription does not extend professions as such. 10. In service jurisprudence, it is settled position of law that merely because a superannuation has the consequence of retiring an employee from service or employment, cannot be frowned upon as amounting to deprivation of a person' ; s right to livelihood because the rule of superannuation does not take away the right of a person livelihood but is aimed to limit the right of such an employee to hold an office by one' ; s appointment to a stated number of years. As already noticed, there is no dispute the case before us does not involve any service of State or employer-employee relationship and, therefore, those principles have no application to this case and the prescription upper age limit cannot be justified for these professionals on the analogy of belonging to' ; service' ; , though prescribing academic qualification or lower age limit reasonable. 11. Before the coming into force of the Licensing RULEs in 1982, anyone could document to be presented for registration. That system was found to be defective detrimental to public interest due to immature and irresponsible preparation documents by persons who were not duly qualified. With a view to ensure that qualified, trained or knowledgeable persons wrote those documents the system of was introduced in 1982 through the RULEs. With a view to make the system perfect effective, rules were amended from time to time. Besides providing for educational qualification, the persons were also required to pass certain examinations (G. O. Ms. No. 317, dated 23. 5. 1990 ). We however, do not find perfection or effectiveness to have achieved by the impugned RULE 4-A, which rule by itself does not safeguard any interest the registering public. We have also not been shown as to in what manner it improves the system of writing documents or makes it more perfect or effective. It lacks utility. 12. It is elementary that every provision of a statute is designed to be workable interpretation thereof by a Court should be aimed at securing that object. The impugned was, as agreed, designed to be a regulatory measure. The statement of objects and however, is not helpful to ascertain the reasons which led the Legislature to impose of 60 years on those who were holding licences to write documents as on 23. 5. 1990. Since the statement objects and reasons is not helpful, we have looked for the reasons through the counter affidavits, because where internal aids are not forthcoming, the courts can always recourse to external aids to discover the objectives of the legislation. It is now a principle of modern statutory construction. The aim and object, as spelt out in the counter affidavits,- instead of being achieved by the impugned rule, does not even go anywhere achieving the objective. If those who attained the age of 60 years were not considered remain suitable and fit enough, mentally and physically to write documents, we understand how the licensees who obtain the licence after 23. 5. 1990 could be permitted continue without any limitation of age, because the bar of age under the impugned rule been restricted only to those who were holding the licence as on 23. 5. 1990. How the holders of licence on that date would be rendered' ; useless' ; as compared to those who may licences after 23. 5. 1990 is not at all intelligible" Thus, the vagueness of the impugned has rendered it unworkable and otiose. 13. We shall now also consider as to whether RULE 4-A (supra) is even otherwise arbitrary and violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India, as argued on behalf appellants. 14. The ambit of Art. 14 of the Constitution of India has undergone a radical change. only frowns upon hostile discrimination and class legislation, but also strikes arbitrariness of State action in any form. No doubt, the principle of equality or arbitrariness does not mean that every law must have a universal application for all persons or cannot apply to the detriment of anyone' ; s interest. The right of the State to classify persons or matters legitimately to achieve a particular object or purpose need not be all embracing uniformly beneficial to every one. The doctrine of classification is merely a judicial formula determining whether or not the action of the State suffers from the vice of arbitrariness, because arbitrariness is the antithesis of reasonableness. Thus, reasonable classification permissible under the constitution, provided it has a nexus or relationship to the sought to be achieved by the impugned legislation. In Ram Krishna Dalmia v. Tendolkar, a. I. R. 1958 S. C. 538, the apex court elaborately dealt with the ambit and of art. 14 of the Constitution and the principles governing the reasonableness or otherwise a classification. The Court held: " (i) A statute may itself indicate the persons or things whom its provisions are intended to apply and the basis of the classification of such persons or things may appear on the fare of the statute or may be gathered from the surrounding circumstances "known to or brought to the notice of the court. In determining the validityotherwise of such a statute the court has to examine whether, such classification is or can reasonably regarded as based upon some differentia which distinguishes such persons things grouped together from those left out of the group and whether such differentia reasonable relation to the object sought to be achieved by the statute, no matter whether the provisions of the statute are intended to apply only to a particular person or thing or to a certain class of persons or things. Where the court finds that the classification satisfies the tests, the court will uphold the validity of the law, as it did in Chrinjitlal Chowdhari v. Union of India, 1950 S. C. R. 869, The State of bombay v. F. N. Balsara, A. I. R. 1951 S. C. 1951 S. C. J. 478: 1951 S. C. R. 682, Kedar nath Bajoria v. The State of West Bengal, 1953 S. C. 404: 1953 S. C. J. 580: 1953 s. C. R. 30, V. M. Syed Mohammed and Company v. State of Andhra Pradesh, (1954)1 m. L. J. 67: A. I. R. 1954 S. C. 181: 1954 S. C. J. 54: S. C. R 391 and Budhan Choudry v. The State of Bihar, (1955) S. C. J. 163: A. I. R. 1955 191. (ii) A statute may direct its provisions against one individual person or thing several individual persons or things, but no reasonable basis of classification may appear the face of it or be deducible from the surrounding circumstances, or matters of common knowledge. In such a case, the court will strike down the law as an instance of discrimination, as it did in Ameerunissa Begum v. Mahboob Begum, (1953) S. C. R. 404 Ramprasad Narain Sahi v. The State of Bihar, (1953) S. C. R. 1129. " 15. Again, in D. S. Nakara v. Union of India, A. I. R. 1983 s. C. 130, the apex court held that persons similarly circumstanced should be treated alike, both in respect of the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Court ruled that the classification must not only be based upon an intelligible differentia which distinguish those that are grouped together from those who are left out but also that the said differentia must have a rational relationship to the object sought to be achieved by the legislation. The court opined that in case of challenge to a State action or legislation based on art. 14 of Constitution, it is an obligation of the State to affirmatively satisfy the court that the tests of reasonable classification and the rational principle correlated to the object sought be achieved have been satisfied. The supreme Court, while pronouncing upon constitutional validity of the classification in the revised pension formula between pensioners on the basis of the date of retirement specified in the memorandum of the Government India dated 28. 9. 1979, held that the date of retirement is a fortuitous circumstance therefore, is wholly irrelevant. 16. In Municipal Corporation, Ahmedabad v. Jan Mohammed, a. I. R. 1986 S. C. 1205, Supreme Court ruled that when the validity of a law placing restriction on the exercise law placing restriction on the exercise of fundamental rights enshrined in Art. 19 (1) (g) of Constitution is challenged, the onus of proving to the satisfaction of the court that restriction is reasonable lies upon the State and the burden is rather heavy. It is in the of these principles, which are well settled, that we shall consider as to whether the stipulation contained in RULE 4-A offends Art. 14 of the Constitution and also whether the State justified the reasonableness of the restriction in the context of Art. 19 (1) (g) of Constitution. 17. The learned Government Pleader sought to support the impugned rule on the ground that the document writers have to shoulder heavy responsibilities in the matter preparation of documents and are expected to write legibly, correctly with the required alterness and knowledge and any failure on their part would affect the parties to document vitally and irretrievably and, therefore, the prescription of an age limit of 60 was intended to secure those aims and objects in public interest. The submission of learned Government Pleader was based on the stand taken by the State, as reflected in counter affidavits filed before us. 18. However laudable the object sought to be achieved may be, we are unable to approve the claim made by the State that on attaining the age of 60 years, the faculties to shoulder responsibilities of the nature visualised in the writing of documents fail in an individual. material has been placed before us to substantiate any such assumption by the respondents. With the advancement of age, it is a matter of common experience, unless proved affected by senility, an individual grows rich in experience and gains skill, talent perfection to do things effectively and handle matters diligently, carefully, judiciously with conviction. This is the normal state of affairs and there is no scope for any assumption to the contrary in favour of the State. We are unable to appreciate the stand on behalf of respondents that the classification based upon age limit has any rational nexus to the sought to be achieved. Even though, RULE 4-A, as already noticed, is vague and indefinite, we find that the prescription of the age limit therein is only for persons who, were holding document Writer' ; s Licence as on 23. 5. 1990. Why a person holding the licence on a particular date alone should be deemed to be suffering from such incapacities to continue to documents and not those who acquire a licence after 23. 5. 1990 defies logic and reason. are unable to agree with the learned government Pleader that RULE 4-A is only a regulatory rule. The provisions contained in the rule are not merely regulatory but restrictive in nature and they place a bar on those who attain the age of 60 years, if they were holding the licence on the date mentioned in the rule. In State of Mysore v. H. Sanjeeviah, A. I. R. 1967 1189, it was held that if the power is only regulatory in nature, there is no scope restricting it in exercise of any such regulatory power. The State has not been able discharge the duty to satisfy us that the restriction, which has been imposed through the is not only reasonable but also has a nexus with the object to be achieved and is in interest. The prescription of age limit for a person to carry on the profession of document writing under the RULEs, if he held the licence on 23. 5. 1990, does not appear to us either the panacea for the so-called ill sought to be remedied or to achieve the object providing employment to the educated unemployed youth, as pleaded before us. We already referred to the provisions of RULE 16 (3) of the rules which empower the licensing authorities to revoke or cancel the licence of document writers, among other things, for' ; unsatisfactory work such a power available to the licensing authorities, we do not see the justification reasonableness in enacting a provision like RULE 4-A. Indeed, rules can prescribe qualifications or disqualifications in respect of the persons seeking licence or possessing licence as document writers, under the rules. But the prescription of age for persons licence on a particular date cannot per se be a valid ground of disqualification, so as to the deprivation of the right of an individual to carry on his profession subject, of course, his satisfying the other norms and qualifications prescribed under the RULEs. A restriction based upon the attainment of 60 years of age, as a disentitling factor for professionals the document writers to carry on their profession under the RULEs, cannot pass the Art. 14 or Art. 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution. The classification flowing out of RULE 4 distinguishes document writers who hold the licence as on 23. 5. 1990 and those who the licence thereafter is not based upon any intelligible differentia, which may distinguish between the two groups of document writers. Indeed, a statute can direct the provisions against an individual only or applicable to several individual persons or things, but there to be a reasonable basis of classification borne on the face of it or deducible from surrounding circumstances. In the instant case, the State has miserably failed demonstrate any such reasonableness or intelligible differentia. We, therefore, find that from the inherent defects from which RULE 4-A suffers, as already indicated by us elsewhere in this judgment, the impugned RULE 4-A also violates Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) Constitution of India and cannot be allowed to stand. The restriction placed on the the document writers, who held the licence as on 23. 5. 1990, to continue to carry profession after they attain the age of 60 years is arbitrary and unreasonable. The law country has recognised that a man has a right to work at his trade or profession being unjustly excluded from it. He cannot be shut out from it at the whim of anyone. rule which authorises the registering authorities and enables them to exclude the writers only on the ground of attaining the age of 60 years, if they held a licence 23. 5. 1990, is arbitrary, capricious, not reasonable and bad in law. It is also against the policy and the court must strike it down and we, accordingly do strike down the RULE 4-A. 19. In view of what we have said above, the grievances projected by the appellants merited. The learned single judges, in our opinion, fell in error in dismissing the writ without going into the different aspects of the case. The judgments under appeal, therefore, cannot be sustained. We, accordingly, accept these appeals and set aside the judgments the learned single judges in the various writ petitions. We hold the impugned rule only to be vague, inherently defective and suffering from the vice of indefiniteness violative of Arts. 14 and 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of India and strike it down as the said Articles. The writs, as prayed for by the appellants are, therefore, hereby We, however, leave the parties to bear their own costs. Appeal allowed. .