K RAJENDRAN Vs. DIRECTOR PERSONNEL PROJECT AND EQUIPMENT

JUDGEMENT

(1.) "for the reasons mentioned in the accompanying affidavit, it is prayed that this Hon'ble Court may be pleased to pass orders and issue directions as may be deemed fit and in particular issue a writ in the nature of certiorarified mandamus quashing that portion of last appointment order, dated 26th June 1986, in Ref. No. PEC. Ms. PERS:rectt 86 issued to the petitioner by the second respondent which says that his services would be liable to be terminated at the end of 44 days as it has now been done by the order, dated 30th July 1986, and direct the respondents to regularise his services and award costs and render justice"

(2.) THE case of the petitioner is as follows: The respondent Corporation, hereinafter called 'the respondent' selected the petitioner for the post of messenger for its Madras office and by the letter, dated 24 March 1983, the respondent offered the petitioner the appointment for the said post for a period of 44 days. The order, dated 24 March 1983, runs as follows:

(3.) SRI S. Ayyathurai, learned counsel for the petitioner, submitted that the petitioner has put in more than 240 days of continuous service within a period of one year as per Section 25b of the Industrial Disputes Act, 1947, hereinafter called the Act; and that respondent should have complied with the mandatory conditions of Section 25f of the Act before terminating the service of the petitioner and since it has not complied with the mandatory conditions of Section 25 of the Act the order of the respondent terminating the service of the petitioner is illegal and liable to be set aside. The learned counsel for the petitioner would further submit that the act of the respondent in appointing the petitioner only for 4 days as daily-wage employee for the period from 24 March 1983 up to 8 September 1986, is an unfair labour practice and, therefore, the impugned termination order is bad in law. On the other hand Sri Balasubramaniam, learned counsel for the respondent, submitted that though the petitioner worked for more than three years in the office of the respondent with a break, since each order of appointment is a separate one for a specified period of 44 days Subclause (bb) of Clause (cc), Section 2 of the Act alone is applicable to the case of the petitioner and, therefore the termination of the service of the petitioner will not amount to retrenchment within the meaning of Section 2 (oo) of the Act and consequently there is no violation of Section 25f of the Act.