P K RAMAKRISHNAN Vs. TAMIL NADU ELECTRICITY BOARD

JUDGEMENT

(1.) AGAINST the Judgment of a learned single Judge in W.P. No. 2016 of 1980 decided in 10.7.1986 a writ appeal has been preferred in this court 1256 days after the expiry of the period of limitation for filing a writ appeal. Through this application, condonation of delay is sought for.

(2.) IN the affidavit filed in support of this application, it has been stated that the applicant had engaged I. Mahaboob Sheriff and M.A. Abdul Rahim as his advocates and that the writ petition was admitted in 1980. After the admission of the writ petition, he had been making enquiries from the counsel regarding the progress of the case. IN paragraph 4 of the affidavit it is stated that after May 1987 the applicant spoke to his counsel at Madras over the telephone to find out about the fate of his case and his counsel informed him that the matter was still pending. It is then stated that on 16.12.1989 the applicant found from the INdian Express that one S.V. Angappan, who was the General Secretary of the Union to which the applicant belonged, had obtained an order from the High Court regarding his reinstatement in service and since the writ petition of Angappan had been filed after the writ petition had been filed by the applicant, he was surprised to find out that the writ petition of Angappan had been disposed of while his was still pending. The applicant then goes on to state that he made a trip to Madras towards the end of January 1990 and visited Mr. Mahaboob Sheriff. He was informed by Mr. Sheriff that his writ petition had been dismissed as early as on 10.7.1986. On the enquiry of the applicant as to why he had not been informed about the posting of the case and the final orders, the counsel is reported to have called his clerk who stated that he had not written a letter to the applicant to inform him about the order in the writ petition. The writ papers were then traced out and handed over to the Union representative Mr. N. Muruganandam on 10.2.1990. Thereafter, the writ appeal was filed and according to the applicant, the delay was solely due to the failure of his counsel and his clerk to promptly inform him about the order of this court dismissing the writ petition and in case the period of limitation is to start from the date of knowledge of the order the delay in filing the appeal would only be two or three weeks.

(3.) ALTHOUGH it is stated in the affidavit filed by the applicant that after the writ petition was admitted in 1980, the applicant had been making enquiries and that an enquiry was made by the applicant in May 1987 on telephone from the counsel and the counsel informed him that the writ petition was still pending, it is not stated in the affidavit on what date the telephone call was made. Be that as it may, it is difficult for us to accept this plea of the applicant. Since the writ petition, admittedly had been dismissed on 10.7.1986, it does not stand to reason why false information should have been given to the applicant by the counsel. It is not a case of the alleged negligence of the counsel but falsehood is attributed to the counsel by stating that he misled the applicant in May 1987, to believe that his writ petition which had actually been dismissed on 10.7.1986, was still pending. The allegation is rather of a serious nature against a member of the profession. The plea is much too vague and nonspecific and does not warrant its acceptance. The applicant has filed along with the memorandum of appeal a copy of the Judgment of the learned single Judge. It shows that the counsel had applied for a carbon copy of the Judgment on 10.7.1986 the date of judgment, itself. The copy was made ready on 22.1.1987 and was delivered to the counsel on 29.1.1987. Why then should the counsel tell falsely to the applicant in May 1987, as alleged, that the writ petition was still pending? We find nothing from the record to suggest a reason for the counsel to mislead the applicant. It appears to us that the plea now put forward is only afterthought and irresponsible allegations have been made against a counsel only to cover up the default of the litigant himself. In all probability the applicant kept no contact with his counsel. If the allegation of the applicant that when he contacted this counsel, the clerk of the counsel (name not disclosed) confessed that he had not informed the applicant about the final order was correct, the applicant would have at least secured the affidavit of the clerk and filed it with his application. He did nothing of the kind and we cannot, therefore accept the (sic) present case of the applicant.