P PONNIAH Vs. ESTATE OFFICER SOUTHERN RAILWAY MADURAI

JUDGEMENT

(1.) The petitioner in W. P. No. 2377 of 1986 is the appellant in this writ appeal. The respondents in the writ petition are the respondents in the writ appeal. We are referring to the parties as per their nomenclature in the writ petition. The petitioner was put in possession of a vacant site belonging to the railways. The petitioner would call the arrnagements a lease. The railways would call it a licence. But, nothing crucial turns upon this aspect when we consider the nature of the controversy which we are called upon to resolve, because the terms of the grant must speak with reference to the rights and obligations of the parties. After issuing the notice of termination, the railways called upon the petitioner to vacate the land after removing the superstructures put up by him. Finding no compliance with the same, the process under the Tamil Nadu Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act, 1976, hereinafter referred to as the Act, has been resorted to and that culminated in an order of eviction being passed by the first respondent. The petitioner preferred an appeal to the fourth respondent and that was dismissed and challenging the orders of the first respondent and the fourth respondent, the petitioner came to this Court by way of the above writ petition.

(2.) Before the learned single Judge, who dealt with the writ petition, the main concentration was on a contention put forth on behalf of the petitioner that the petitioner is a tenant within the meaning of Tamil Nadu City Tenants Protection Act, 1922, hereinafter referred to as the Protection Act, and hence the petitioner could not be dispossessed by resorting to the process under the Act. The learned single Judge repelled this line of thinking put forth on behalf of the petitioner by his learned counsel, holding that in respect of Government Grants, the rights under the Protection Act cannot be claimed. The learned single Judge also held that even if the Protection Act is to be invoked, the process under the Act is not excluded and untenable. There were also contentions raised with reference to, the lease being a perpetual one on the ground that permanent superstructures have been put up, the notice of termination being not valid in law; the obligation to resort to arbitration; the purpose for which the land was sought to be resumed having been served, the propriety of the eviction proceedings being pursued; and the action of the railways abrogating the right to livelihood of the petitioner. All these contentions were also repelled by the learned single Judge. As a result, the writ petition was dismissed. This has obliged the petitioner to prefer this writ appeal.

(3.) Before us, Mr. E. Padmanabhan, learned counsel for the petitioner, appellant herein, would project in main the point built on the Protection Act and would say that the Protection Act being applicable to the case on hand, the process under the Act ought not to have been resorted to and that would abrogate the rights secured to the petitioner under the Protection Act. We carefully examined the provisions of the Act and the Protection Act. We are proceeding on the hypothesis that the petitioner could claim the benefits of the Protection Act, even though it is a case of Government grant. The provisions of the Protection Act do not impose any embargo with reference to eviction of a city tenant. The rights secured to a city tenant under the Protection Act are to claim on eviction compensation for the superstructures put up by him and in such a contingency also put forth a right to purchase the land on which such superstructures are put up. The provisions of the Act for eviction as such could certainly be resorted to, despite the Protection Act. It must be noted here that the petitioner did not, of his own, move any independent process for securing the rights, if any, available to him under the Protection Act. We do not get any explanation, much less a convincing one therefor. That question apart, as stated earlier, in the absence of any specific provision in the Protection Act, casting an embargo with reference to the eviction of a city tenant. We are not able to spell out any inhibition for the working of the provisions of the Act for eviction of a city tenant. Even in the Act, there is no exclusion of the process thereunder, in respect of a city tenant. The reliance placed by Mr. E. Padmanabhan on the pronouncement of the learned single Judge of the High Court of Delhi in D.S.C. Archdiocese v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 1976 Delhi 251, could not be of any avail to his client because we could not express or support a proposition that rights higher than or different from those conferred by the grant, with reference to the eviction process with which alone we are now concerned, have come to be conferred on the petitioner under the Protection Act. Learned Counsel for the petitioner also relied on the pronouncement of the Supreme Court in Express Newspapers Pvt. Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1986 SC 872 to say that when superstructures have been put up with the sanction of the grantor there is no question of applying the provisions of the Act for eviction of the petitioner. On facts, we could not find any parity between that case and the present case. In that case, there were permanent constructions put up by the grantee with the sanction of the grantor, the Union of India, and in that context and on the facts of that case, it was opined that by no process of reasoning, the conerned premises could be regarded as public premises within the meaning of the Act. In the present case, clause 4 of the grant has specifically inhibited the grantee from erecting or causing to be erected on the land or any part thereof any structure of a permanent or a quasi permanent nature. Clause 14(1) lays down that on determination of the grant, the licensee shall remove the structures at his own cost. These clauses govern the rights and obligations of the parties, de hors the question as to whether the petitioner has, in fact, put up superstructure of permanent nature or not. In spite of these clauses, if the petitioner has put up superstructures of permanent nature, he has taken the risk and he cannot, on that ground, stultify the action for eviction under the Act.