(1.) PLAINTIFFS are the appellants. The filed the suit for specific performance of an agreement to reconvey the suit immoveable properties and for damages. The father of plaintiffs 1 to 3 executed a sale deed in favour of the defendant in respect of the suit property on 29th July 1963. On the same day under Ex. A-1 the defendant agreed to reconvey the property to the vendor if a sum of Rs. 1,600 and half of the expenses of the sale deed was paid to him within five years. On 5th may 1965 the father of the plaintiffs 1 to 3 died. On 7th June 1966 plaintiffs 1 to 3, the sons and the fourth plaintiff the widow sent a notice to the defendant demanding execution of the reconveyance and stating that they are ready and willing to pay the amount as per Ex, A-1 the agreement of reconveyance. On 14 the June 1966, the defendant sent a reply refusing to execute the reconveyance and stating that he was not bound to execute the reconveyance under the terms of Ex. A-1. The trial Court decreed the suit as prayed for. On appeal by the defendant, the lower appellate Court came to the conclusion that the defendant was not bound to execute the reconveyance in favour of the legal representatives in view of the terms of the reconveyance agreement.
(2.) UNDER Section 15 of the Specific Relief Act. 1963, specific performance of a contract may be obtained by any party thereto or by the representative in interest or the principal of any party thereto except where the learning, skill, solvency or any personal quality of such party is a material ingredient in the contract, or where the contract provides that his interest shall not be assigned. There could be no dispute that in a contract of reconveyance of immoveable property no learning skill, or solvency or any personal quality of such party was a material ingredient. The plaintiff being the legal representatives of the person in who favour the agreement of reconveyance was executed, they are entitled to specific performance of the contract under Section 15 (b) unless there is anything in the contract itself against the legal representatives claiming the specific performance. A true translation of the relevant clause in the agreement which was relied on by the lower appellate Court in support of its finding that there was a prohibition of sale in favour of the legal representatives is as follows:
(3.) THE second appeal is, therefore, allowed. The judgment and decree of the lower appellate court are restored. The appellant will be entitled to their costs in the second appeal. No leave.