(1.) THE petitioner was running a race with the second respondent from fasli 1379 till date to get a lease of the sand quarry right in S. Nos. 185 and 363 of vengathur and Putlur villages. From fasli 1379 the second respondent obtained a lease from the first respondent for a stated consideration, as rent. A third party filed a writ petition stating that an auction ought to have been held and if an auction was so held, he would have paid for a higher amount than that offered by the second respondent. He failed both in the writ petition and in the appeal thereon. For fasli 1380 the second respondent secured a renewal of the lease. It was then the petitioner intervened and sought to interdict such renewal by filing an application for the grant. His request was rejected on the ground that for the fasli in question the lease gad been granted in favour of the second respondent. The petitioner thereafter came to this court under Art. 226 of the Constitution, but was unsuccessful. Fasli 1380 expired on 30-6-1971. On 15-1-1971, the second respondent filed a petition requesting for a further grant of the lease for fasli 1381. The application was routed to the Tahsildar of the concerned firka for report. The Tahsildar reported that there was no scope for further quarrying in the area, since there was not sufficient sand in it, and it was on this ground that the application for renewal dated 15-1-1971 made by the second respondent for fasli 1381 was rejected. The second respondent, however, was optimistic and he pursued the matter on his own and brought to the notice of the authorities that the quarry site did possess fresh deposits of sand and that there was scope for quarrying even during the current fasli. When the matter was referred back to the tahsildar, Tiruvellore, once over, he agreed with the second respondent. It was in that connection and in those circumstances that the representation made by the second respondent that he was entitled as of right to a renewal, as he had made such an application for the purpose within time, was accepted by the State acting through the Collector of the District, and the challenged order was passed. In the order of the Collector of the District, and the challenged order was passed. In the order of the Collector of Chingleput dated 20-9-1971, which is challenged, the collector finds that the application for renewal which was well within time and which ought to have been considered in a manner known to law, was rejected on facts which were later found to be incorrect and that it was in those circumstances that he granted renewal of the lease in favour of the second respondent. He also noted that the applicant's case was that he had lost a sum of Rs. 15,000, due to court expenses and to the formation of road and that it would cause undue prejudice if the lease was not renewed for the current fasli. The petitioner's case is that at or about that time, when the lease for fasli 1380 came to an end, he enquired in the office of the first respondent and in the office of the local Tahsildar whether the right to quarry sand would again be leased out for fasli 1381 commencing from 1-7-1971. His case is that, on his oral approach, he was orally informed that the right to quarry would neither be renewed nor a fresh lease granted to anybody nor an auction conducted therefor. This fact, however, is denied by the first respondent. He would state that the contention of the petitioner, that he was interested in applying for the lease of the quarry and that he enquired about the availability of the quarry, is not correct. It is not, however, necessary to take any notice of this factual representation contained in the affidavit in support of the writ petition, as the record does not bear out the same, and there is nothing in writing to corroborate that such efforts were taken or made by the petitioner.
(2.) TO continue the narrative, the first respondent passed the impugned order on 20-9-1971 renewing the lease in favour of the second respondent for fasli 1381, in the circumstances stated above. The first contention of Mr. Venugopal, the learned counsel for the petitioner, is that the application for renewal having been dealt with at one point of time, to wit, on 4-6-1971, when the application for renewal dated 15-1-1971 was rejected, there could be no fresh appraisal of the situation either at the instance of the second respondent or otherwise, since such action on the part of the first respondent, who is a quasi judicial authority to sanction such grants, would virtually amount to a review of the order made on 4-6-1971. The argument is prima facie attractive. It is undoubtedly clear that the power to review, even if it is assumed to be vested in quasi-judicial tribunals, is a creature of the statute or provision of law which enables them to re-deal with the original matters. It cannot be assumed, if it is not so provided specifically or by necessary implication. But the question is whether in this case the order impugned should be deemed to be an order made in the normal exercise of the powers of review as is ordinarily understood. The application for renewal was rejected on the score that there was no scope for further quarrying in the area as reported by the then tahsildar, Trivellore, Factually that was an incorrect appreciation of the facts and circumstances which prevailed on site. The counter affidavit also discloses that this report, which was obviously incorrect, was not acted upon, since no possession of the quarry site was ever taken from the second respondent. Therefore, at the beginning of fasli 1381 there was no sand quarry to be leased out, according to the report originally made by the Tahsildar.
(3.) THE ancillary contention in support of the main one that the challenged order is in the nature of an order passed on review, is that the first respondent ought to have acted under R. 8 of the rules framed under Section 16 of the Mines and minerals (Regulation and Development) Act, 1957, Rule 8 deals with the lease of quarries to private persons. The essential prerequisite therefore is that a quarry should be in existence on the date when the fasli begins, and the impression gained by the Collector at or about the time by reason of the reports furnished to him by his subordinates was that there was no quarry at all. Thus there was no necessity for him to act under Rule 8. I am therefore unable to agree with the learned counsel for the petitioner that the prescribed procedure under the rules have not been followed.