IN RE: NARAYANA PANICKER Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) IT is unnecessary for me to refer to the facts proved by P. Ws. 1 to 7 and Exs. PI to P. 28. The accused is a lessee of a rice mill under the mother of one Jayaraman. His period of lease ended on 31st March 1966 according to the case of Jayaraman. In the month of February 1966, the licence for the rice mill was transferred by the mother of Jayaraman to her son Jayaraman. The alleged date of the offence when the accused petitioner was running this machinery was 20th June 1969. The accused petitioner himself applied for a licence for the purpose of carrying on the rice mill in operation in February 1969 itself. The learned trial Magistrate, in paragraphs 8 and 9 has elaborately dealt with the contentions raised before him and concluded that since a person running the machinery should have a licence in this case the accused, who was having the ultimate control over the machinery and milling operation necessarily ought to have obtained a licence in his name for that operation. Undoubtedly, on the facts proved, the accused petitioner was carrying on rice milling operation by virtue of his position as a lessee under the mother of Jayaraman. It would emerge from the records that on the date of the alleged offence the accused petitioner Narayana Panicker was not even having the protection of a valid lease in his favour. But, nevertheless, he was carrying the milling operation on the date of the alleged offence, namely 20th June 1969. Mr. Ramaswami argued that a lease can he deemed to be an owner within the meaning of S. 3(g) of the Rice Milling Industry (Regulation) Act, 1958. Firstly, on the facts proved, I am bound to hold that the accused petitioner was not even having a valid lease granted by Jayaraman, the son of Azhagammal in favour of the accused petitioner with effect from 1st April 1966. Nevertheless, the accused petitioner was undoubtedly carrying on rice milling operation. As observed by me earlier, he even applied for a licence under S. 8 (2) of the Act, In February 1969. But the question that has got to be determined, on the facts proved by this Court is whether the accused petitioner could be described as 'owner'. There is do doubt that assuming that the accused petitioner has a valid lease in his favour, even then he would be a person who has the ultimate control over the affairs of the rice mill for he has practically the direction and control over the affairs of the rice mill as the lessee on the spot. When once there is a lease, the lesser disappears from the scene so fat as 'the ultimate control over the affairs of the rice mill' is concerned. The lessor may even own the rice mill and the premises thereof; but once there is a lease in favour of the accused petitioner, the lessor certainly does not have any ultimate control over the affairs of the rice mill. The real actual de facto and ultimate control ever the affairs of the rice mill resides in the accused -petitioner and therefore he can be described as the 'owner' within the meaning of S. 3 (g) of the Central Act 21 of 1958. I find no merits in this revision. The revision, petition is dismissed.