IN RE: VEERABAHU KONAR Vs. STATE

JUDGEMENT

(1.) THE crucial point which arises for consideration in this appeal is whether the Appellant has made out an absolute right of private defence; on the admitted and established facts of the case, we have not the slightest hesitation in holding that the Appellant has clearly established such a right and he has to be acquitted. In view of the statement of the Appellant under Section 342 Crl. P.C., there is no serious controversy that the deceased died as a result of the cut injuries inflicted by the Appellant. The learned Sessions Judge has unnecessarily devoted a considerable portion of his judgment in discussing that portion of the occurrence about which there is no controversy, with the result that his discussion about the crucial point is diffused and he has not come into grips with the real problem.

(2.) AS regards the crucial point about the occurrence, that is the precise circumstances under which the Appellant inflicted injuries upon the deceased, there has been very clever manipulation and artificial spacing of events to make it appear that at the moment when the injuries were inflicted upon the deceased, he was unarmed and was chased by the Appellant and thereafter the cut injuries were inflicted. As we shall presently show, P.W., 1, the son of the deceased who was present throughout the occurrence along with his mother, P. W. 2, has given a false and truncated version in the first information report deliberately suppressing an inseparable and integral part of the occurrence in an attempt to make out that the occurrence is capable of being conveniently dissected into two distinct parts. This artificiality, so much relied upon by the prosecution is apparent on the face of the record and is exposed by the very witnesses relied upon by the prosecution.

(3.) WHEN there is direct conflict between the evidence of P. W. 1 who gave the FIR and P. W. 2 on the one hand and P. W. 3 on the ether, with regard to the main occurrence, the prosecution cannot claim to have established the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The statement of the accused is not on the face of it false or incredible. He did sustain injuries inflicted by the aruval and stick and the case presented by him for exercising his right of self -defence is a plausible theory. It well fits in with the background of the occurrence, especially when the party of the prosecution are the aggressors. In such a context, it is settled law that even though the accused has not conclusively established the right of self defence as raised by him he would still be entitled to the benefit of doubt. The real question is not whether the accused has conclusively and completely established his right of self defence fully proving his version of the episode but whether in view of the truncated, false and suppressed version given by the prosecution, the accused is not raising a plausible theory that in all probability his version may be the true one. The instant case is clearly governed by the well -established principles which have been reiterated in the recent decision of this Court to which I was a party in Lakshmanan v. Lakshmanan : (1964) 1 M.L.J. 41. It is sufficient to extract the following statement of the law at page 46: